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ABSTRACT 
Cooperative agricultural activity has existed in Vietnam in various forms for many 
decades. Under central planning, cooperative institutions provided a means for the 
government to extract surplus from agriculture for the development of the industrial sector. 
Now, under policies promoting market liberalization in agriculture, household farming units 
are no longer obliged to transact with the cooperative. The focus of this dissertation is on the 
interaction between autonomous household production units and cooperative institutions. 
Collective action around irrigation represents one economic motive for coop 
participation. Recent developments in club theory provide a conceptual framework within 
which analysis can be conducted. The (partially) non-rival and excludable characteristics of 
irrigation satisfy the requirement of the model while the presence of agricultural cooperatives 
suggests a possible means for organizing household production units for eflBcient utilization of 
irrigation. A household production model is employed to address the external affects of 
irrigation among households. The conditions of Pareto optimality for the hybrid model, which 
combines club theory and household production theory, are derived and compared with the 
corresponding conditions of conventional club models. The comparative statics of the model 
are exploited to derive labor market consequences of a shared partially non-rival good. 
An empirical analysis is conducted using data from The Living Standards 
Measurement Survey- an elaborate household and community questionnaire which contains 
substantial data on household use of irrigation and participation in cooperatives. Evidence is 
reported for model predictions regarding coop formation, coop participation and labor market 
vi 
efifects. The appropriateness of the model confirmed the viability of state cooperatives in a 
liberalized economy and confirmed the gains in labor productivity due to irrigation 
infi^structure. 
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CHAPTER I. COOPERATIVES IN VIETNAM 
Introduction 
Irrigation has been an important aspect of the economic growth of virtually all 
developing countries. Sociologists and economists have generated a large and substantive 
literature regarding irrigation in developing countries.' Much of this literature is devoted to 
the organization of communities around irrigation facilities. 
To my knowledge, household production models which include irrigation 
interdependencies have not been applied to the analysis of farm-level decisions. Household 
production models have provided considerable insight regarding labor decisions. Adapting 
household production to include collective action regarding irrigation is one way to forge a link 
between irrigation and household production and consumption decisions, including labor decisions. 
Club theory has been used to address issues related to collective action. Because club 
theory intends to "cover the whole spectrum of ownership-consumption possibilities, ranging from 
the purely private or individualized activity on the one hand to purely public or collectivized activity 
on the other" (Buchanan [1965], p. 1) it is particulariy suited to address issues of an irrigating 
community in which the irrigation services available to the individuals in the community are neither 
purely private nor purely public. Specifically, club theory has been used to address issues related 
to finance, resource allocation and Pareto eflBciency, all of which are relevant issues for irrigating 
'Martin (1989) provides a list of 748 region-specific irrigation studies covering Afiica, 
Central America, South Asia, the Middle East, the Orient, the Pacific region and South 
America. 
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communities. To modify household production to include a club input allows analysis of the 
interaction between irrigation and household consumption and production. 
In addition to exploring new theoretical junctures, the proposed research will contribute to 
the sparsely studied region of Vietnam. Still a communist country, Vietnam has taken significant 
steps away from a centrally planned economy and toward a market economy. Vietnam has a vast 
irrigation and drainage system that is ciucial for growth in {^cultural output and productivity. 
How irrigation is utilized is an important policy issue facing this emerging exporter of rice. 
The dissertation is organized as follows. The rest of this chapter provides a more thorough 
discussion of cooperatives in Vietnam including a brief historical review. Chapter II reviews the 
club theory literature and simultaneously constructs a production model which includes a club 
input. Chapter UI develops an ectension of the model, which includes simultaneously determined 
consumption choices, connecting club theory with household production theory. Chapter FV 
constructs and estimates an empirical model which tests hypotheses related to the nature of 
irrigation and the value of coops. Chapter V constructs and evaluates an empirical model which 
tests hypotheses related to the impact on labor markets. Chapter VI presents a summary and 
conclusions. 
Cooperatives in Vietnam 
A brief historical review 
In order to establish the importance of cooperatives it is necessaiy to understand the 
history of cooperatives in Vietnam. In the north, agriculture was collectivized from the late I950's 
to 1990; in the south, collectivization was attempted only after reunification in 1975. In the north. 
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the transition to a centrally planned economy (from colotualism) took approximately 15 years. 
Efforts to collectivize in the south, however, never succeeded. Even though in 1976 the 
Communist Party adopted a resolution that all party leaders in the south move toward 
collectivization, by 1986 only 6% of farmers in the Mekong delta were members of cooperatives 
compared to 99% of formers in the Red River delta (Pingali and Xuan [1992]). This failure to 
collectivize was due in part to the brief time provided for the attempt. Four years after 
reunification, the household contract system was implemented which, at least partially, undermined 
the formation of collective production teams. 
After reunification, two separate systems of incentives existed - a cooperative, centrally 
planned system in the north and a more liberalized system in the south. The two systems varied 
greatly in economic performance. Production levels were much higher in the south while 
production in the north stagnated, a foct which has led some to conclude that the production 
incentives in the south were superior to those in the north (e.g. Pingali and Xuan [1992]). 
Although in the north the government had a high degree of control over agricultural markets 
through cooperatives, in the south, experience with free markets had eroded that control and 
unleashed more powerful production incentives. 
The government has recently admitted the failure of the centrally planned economy and the 
superiority of the production incentives in a market economy. Consistent with this reversal, more 
powerful production incentives were cemented for farmers in the form of the 1993 Land Law. 
This law broadened and made more permanent the land use rights established for farmers in 1988. 
Among the provisions in the law is the right to lease land for up to 50 years. If the effects of "the 
land to the tiller" program are any indication, the new law will increase farm-level investment and 
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agricultural productivrty (Cailison [1983]). Consequently, apart from the presence of substantial 
gains from collective action, it is expected that former participation in cooperatives will continue to 
decline. 
Activities of Vietnamese cooperatives 
Tax Collecting 
In some areas of Vietnam the scope of the cooperative's responsibilities includes sale 
of inputs, purchase of output and collection of land taxes (Chung and Weber [1994]). In the 
past, the cooperatives have functioned as tax collecting agencies of the state by oflfering prices 
for agricultural products which were typically much lower than the market price (White 
[1985]). The dependency on the cooperatives for inputs and employment has ensured high 
rates of participation in the cooperatives which, in turn, has reduced the costs of monitoring 
farmers with regard to their compliance with tax obligations. In fact, a recent study (Chung 
and Weber [1994]) shows that 5-10% of agricultural output is still procured by the 
cooperative. The study demonstrates the ease with which the State can confiscate output in 
the north. These cooperatives have been surprisingly compliant with taxation obligations. It 
is not clear whether such compliance will continue or whether fanners will estimate 
probabilities of enforcement or monitoring and opt to evade the taxation obligations. 
Agricultural Input Distribution 
Trade in agricultural inputs has been guided by the state to varying degrees throughout 
the country. For most of the country inputs have been distributed to cooperatives according 
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to National Land Use Plans. In the past, the cooperatives distributed the inputs to production 
teams. In the Mekong Delta private markets for fertilizer and pesticides have been present 
since 1988 (Pingali and Xuan [1992]). Also, several Mekong provinces have imported urea 
and di-ammonia phosphate independently of the central government. 
The trend of replacing cooperative trades with market trades is apparent in the north 
as well as the south. Chung and Weber (1994) found that 70% of pesticide and fertilizer were 
obtained from private traders. However, they also note that poor farmers rely more heavily 
on the cooperative for inputs than do wealthy farmers. 
Irrigation Services Distribution 
Cooperatives have also played an important role in distributing irrigation services and 
mobilizing resources for the operation and maintenance of water control facilities. Irrigation 
services are widely available in Vietnam and are utilized by many farmers. In the Chung and 
Weber sample of 201 households in the north, no farmer was without access to irrigation 
services. Khiem and Pingali (1994) report that over 80% of the 6 million hectares of rice sown 
area in 1990 was irrigated. Small, Bruns and Herklots (1993) state that the portion is only 
two thirds. The fact remains that a vast area of irrigated land exists in Vietnam and yet not all 
farmers are irrigating. 
Small (1994a, 1994b) has noted that in Quang Nam-Da Nang province in Vietnam 
cooperatives have a direct role in distributing water to individual household fields and 
collecting irrigation fees. In other cases the cooperatives contract out the task of distribution 
to Village Administrative Boards (Ban Dan Chinh Thon). In other cases, the Village 
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Administrative Boards, not cooperatives, organize local communities. In general, the 
cooperatives function as intermediaries between households and the Irrigation Management 
Enterprise (Xi Nghiep Khai Thai Thuy Loi) which operates the main irrigation facilities. 
The Economic Benefits of Irrigation 
The ability to control water on rice fields represents an important factor in rice 
production. In areas where total rainfall is adequate for rice production, yield reductions may 
nevertheless occur due to untimely rainfall. Where this is the case water control may have 
substantial economic benefits. Chambers (1988, p. 25) cites data which shows that in 4 Indian 
states the unirrigated areas produced much less food grain (per hectare) than the irrigated 
areas. Also for India, Easter (1986) shows that application of water fi-om either wells or tanks 
has a significant and positive effect on rice yields. In Northeast Thailand, net return from crop 
production was as much as eight times greater in irrigated areas than in non-irrigated areas 
(Apinantara and SriswasdiIek [1986]). For rice produaion irrigation influences yields 
substantially. 
The Nature of Irrigation 
It is important to note that the nature of the good provided by the cooperative may 
influence the incentive structure faced by the household. In particular, many have noted the 
feature of partial non-rivalry in irrigation services (see, for example. Small, Bruns and 
Herklots [1993]). That is, the consumption of a unit of irrigation services does not entirely 
reduce the consumption opportunities of the same unit of irrigation services of some other 
person. 
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Less clear perhaps is the feature of excludability. In the irrigation systems common to 
Southeast Asia the delivery of water to individual plots is carried out by relatively small 
groups of people from the local community. On this scale, monitoring and enforcement of 
individual farm household decisions is well within the realm of possibility. Although some 
have neglected this fact (Tang [1992]), others have noted the effectiveness of social 
organizations to enforce community-wide irrigation practices (see for example, the discussion 
of the Balinese subak in Hutapea, Dirjasanyata and Nordholt [1978]). The ease with which an 
irrigating community can enforce agreements regarding individual household produaion 
decision implies, at least in some general sense, excludability. With perfect excludability any 
farmer can be refused all benefits of irrigation if he does not meet the obligations 
commensurate with receiving benefits. Where both excludability and partial non-rivalry are 
features of irrigation then irrigation can be characterized as a club good which is impurely 
public. 
By emphasizing the non-rival features of irrigation fecilities such as primary canals, 
reservoirs or large pumping stations, irrigation services may appear to be purely public in nature. 
Small (1994b) adds to this list by suggesting that operation and maintenance (0«&M) of the 
facilities constitutes a pure public good: 
Irrigation involves many externalities among the people ferming within the irrigated area. 
Externalities and public goods aspects are also typical of the many irrigation services 
associated with the O&M of the irrigation facilities. Maintaining an irrigation channel free 
of weeds and silt fecilitates the flow of water, and thus enhances the ability of the channel 
to deliver water to all the fields served by it. Channel maintenance is thus a public good, as 
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all formers served by the channel thus benefit fi-om the foct that water flows quickly 
through it, regardless of whether or not they contnbuted to its maintenance. The situation 
with respect to irrigation operation is similar. Once arrangements have been established for 
the effective operation of the irrigation focilities, all the formers served by the system will 
benefit, regardless of their contribution to the cost of these arrangements, (p. 3) 
In addition. Small continues with an explanation of at least one way irrigation services may be 
partially non-rival; "Ifi for example, an upstream former diverts an excessive portion of the flow of 
water in a channel into his field, downstream formers will suffer fi^om a shortage of water." (p. 3) 
Upstream overuse of water resources is a fi"equent source of conflict attributable to the 
non-rival features of irrigation.^ One might also conceive of other more hypothetical situations in 
which non-rival features are operative. For example, the topography of the area adjacent to a 
channel's banks may require several foraiers to irrigate fi'om the same location on the channel. 
Thus, irrigation by one fomier may result in waiting costs for other irrigating farmers. 
Apart from increased costs on some farmers due to increased use by others of the 
irrigation facilities there may be direct production consequences on some due to the increased 
use by others of the irrigation focilities. For instance, in a typical gravity scheme, irrigation 
water flows over an adjacent field before it reaches the end consumer. That is, there is an 
" A domestic case in point is the dispute between the U.S. states of Colorado and Kansas over 
water use rights of the Arkansas river. The widespread practice adopted by Colorado formers of 
drilling irrigation wells prevented the Arkansas river fi'om attaining usual flow levels, depriving 
downstream Kansas formers of irrigation opportunities. (Kansas Alumni Magazine, 
August/September 1995) 
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excess amount of water which is drained from an adjacent field and is subsequently available 
for irrigation purposes. The portion of the irrigation services used by an individual that is 
recycled for use by others no longer has the same quality as the original units of irrigation 
services. Thus, when irrigation services are utilized by high elevation users the amount of the 
services available to low elevation others is reduced not only in amount but also in quality. 
The reduced quality directly affects production possibilities. 
Collective Action around Imgation 
To the extent that external effects exist in irrigation, absence of a market for the rights to 
create those external effects prevents a competitive economy from attaining eflBcient levels of 
irrigation usage. Consequently, some degree of collective action is necessary at either the national 
government or the community level to coordinate or induce individual activity to conform to that 
which is consistent with thS eflBcient outcome. It is in this capacity that agricultural cooperatives in 
Vietnam may find economic viability. 
Recall that in a former life the Vietnamese agricultural cooperative existed as a collective 
farm and as a means of the government to extraa surplus from agriculture. Now, in a market-
oriented economy the agricultural cooperative must provide economically viable services or else it 
simply will not exist. In fact, some predicted the demise of cooperatives shortly after the initial 
reforms (e.g. Hiebert [1988]). However, the distribution of irrigation services among community 
members is an important economic fimction that a coop can have in a market economy. Referring 
to communities in Quang Nam-Da Nang province in Vietnam, Small states: 
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"Responsibility for organizing and finandng the construction and O&M [of &imer-
managed irrigation schemes] lies entirely with the agricultural cooperatives. Most of these 
fanner-managed schemes in Quang Nam-Da Nang use pumps to lift water from rivers or 
other bodies of surfece water. Although these pump schemes are relatively ©q)ensive to 
operate (particularly in those cases where they must rely on charcoal-generated water gas 
to power the engines for pumping), the cooperatives are able to manage them effectively, 
resulting in economic benefits to the formers large enough to justify their cost." (1994b, p. 
4) 
In this particular province (and probably in many others) the government maintains the 
primary and secondary canals of the irrigation system while the local agricultural cooperative 
maintains the tertiary and quaternary canals which deliver water to individual land holdings (Small, 
Bruns and Herklots [1993]). This system estabh'shes a role for the agricultural cooperative of 
organizing local formers in order to distribute irrigation services as efficiently as possible. 
The Context of Transition From a Centrally Planned Economy 
Currently in Vietnam financing for large scale irrigation facilities is provided by the State as 
it is in market economies. Such was also the case prior to "economic renovation" {doi moi) which 
began in the eariy 1990s. However, public provision of operation and maintenance at the local 
level cannot reasonably be expected to continue under current plans to transition to a market 
economy. In the past, the government, because it owned either the land or the output or both, was 
able to extract agricultural surplus via the agricultural cooperative to pay for the public focilities 
down to the local level. By liberalizing the output markets the government can no longer generate 
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public fiinds in this manner. The Vietnamese irrigating community in the 1990's must find a way to 
finance local operation and maintenance of the irrigation Polities or face reduced aggregate output 
resulting fi'om deteriorated infiastructure or suboptimal aggregate irrigation use. 
Implications on the Demand for Other Productive Inputs 
Less transparent than the financing issue which faces Vietnamese irrigating communities is 
the issue of input substitution with irrigation. Insofar as irrigation and other inputs are substitutes 
for one another in the household's production function, the degree to which communities 
coordinate irrigation decisions affects the demand for other inputs. 
The benefits of irrigation for Vietnamese mral communities may exist not only in the form 
of increased production but also in the form of increased labor productivity. Thus, where collective 
action around irrigation may not be justified on the grounds of increased income it may very well 
be justified on the grounds of preserving other inputs. 
The labor-leisure decision provides a relevant example. Suppose that irrigation and labor 
are gross substitutes. As the price of irrigation increases, the demand for labor also increases and 
therefore leisure decreases. Either by strong substitutability between labor and irrigation or by 
strong tastes for leisure the incentives for acting coUectively are strengthened. Where both of these 
effects are strong there is substantial incentive for collective action around irrigation. 
The issue of substitutability of other inputs with irrigation is a central one in this 
dissertation. Hitherto unstudied, this issue may partiy explain the disparity of participation rates in 
agricultural cooperatives between those in the north and those in the south. In order to examine 
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this issue, it seems both necessary and desirous to construct a formal model. The next chapter 
intends to fulfill that desire. 
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CHAPTER II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND MODEL OF A CLUB INPUT 
In this chapter, the notion of a club is developed. The treatment focuses on the nature 
of a club of producers as opposed to a club of consumers, the latter being the model that 
dominates the literature. The neglect of producer clubs may be due, in part, to the 
presumption that such clubs parallel consumer clubs. In a general equilibrium setting, this is 
not the case. In order to identify the distinctiveness of a producer club, a formal model must 
be developed, a task to which this chapter is devoted. The first section briefly reviews the 
basic concepts of a consumer club. The second section characterizes efficiency for a model of 
a club input, as opposed to a club good. The third section formalizes individual optimization 
for a member of the producer club. 
Review of Basic Club Concepts 
Club theory, as it is known in the field of economics, is based on concepts that are 
familiar to non-economists as well as economists. When sociologists speak of conmiunities 
acting collectively toward a goal or for a cause that improves the entire community, they rely 
on concepts similar to those which underlie club theory. Both fields admit that certain 
incentives are necessary for such collective action to take place. Perhaps the sociologist 
would allow altruism to play a part in those incentives. Economists typically have not. In his 
seminal article, Buchanan (1965) formalized the economic incentives that could support 
collective action. In particular, he supposed that a partially non-rival good whose purchase 
price far exceeded the benefit to any one member of the community could be purchased 
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collectively (the cost being shared by the members of the community) such that the benefit to 
each member was at least as great as that member's share of the cost. In this case, economic 
incentives are sufficient to forge collective action in the provision of the collective good. That 
the collective good is partially non-rival implies that the size of the club (collective) adversely 
affects the benefit of each and every member, at least over a specified range of sizes. In 
general, the optimal club size will not include the entire population. Consequently, exclusion 
is necessary to achieve optimal outcomes. 
Buchanan (1965) spawned a vast literature on club theory that has produced a variety 
of useful models. These models have shed light on a host of normative issues including the 
efficient distribution of clubs in the economy and the efficient provision of club facilities and 
services. Thorough surveys are found in Sandler and Tschirhart (1980) and Blumel, Pethig 
and von dem Hagen (1986). A more modest attempt is made here to synthesize three decades 
of productive research. Berglas, Helpman and Pines (1982) and Comes and Sandler (1986) 
provide categorizations of club models. Taken together, four distinguishing features of the 
models appear. Club models 
1. are either fixed-use or variable-use models, 
2. have a variable number of clubs or a predetermined number of clubs, 
3. have the entire population or only part of the population in a club, 
4. have homogeneous or heterogeneous memberships. 
While there may be other ways to characterize the literature, these four characteristics 
of club models highlight several important issues raised by club models. By distinguishing 
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between fixed-use and variable-use clubs, the models shed light on, respectively, pure local 
public goods- where it is usually assumed that the level of the public good is consumed by 
each member of the community- and public services that are made possible by the existence 
of public facilities- where it is usually assumed that individual consumption of the services can 
be less than but not greater than some level determined by the facilities. The variable-use 
models distinguish between services that are non-rival and the facilities that provide those 
services. By making this distinction, club models have been applied to a wide array of 
situations. To borrow the fi'equently used example of a swimming pool, the models make the 
important distinction between the individual visits to the swimming pool and the swimming 
pool itself The former represents consumption of services while the latter represents the 
facilities that make possible the consumption of services. Examples of these models are found 
in Oakland (1972), Berglas and Pines (1981), Berglas (1976b), Berglas, Helpman and Pines 
(1982), Sandler and Tschirhart (1980), Sandler (1984), Scotchmer and Wooders (1987b) and 
more recently in Menezes and Silva (1995). Examples of fixed use clubs include Berglas 
(1976a), McGuire (1974), Berglas (1984) and more recently Henderson (1994) and McGuire 
(1991). 
This subtle conceptual distinction highlighted the difference between membership fee 
and a "visitation" or use fee, the former being a fee structure that yields an efficient outcome 
in fixed-use models and the latter being a fee structure that yields an efficient outcome in 
variable-use models. In the latter case, a membership fee creates incentives such that club 
members use the facilities until their marginal benefit of doing so is zero. However, the 
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distinaion between fixed-use and variable-use clubs is not important for many of the basic 
conclusions of club theory, including the Tiebout hypothesis. 
Tiebout (1956) showed that a consumer-voter will move to a different location, in part 
because the destination location offers a package of local public goods that most closely 
reflects the preference of the consumer-voter. To obtain this result Tiebout made several 
assumptions, including perfect mobility in the population, complete information about all 
locations, a sufficient number of locations to satisfy the tastes of every consumer-voter. As a 
consequence, communities tend to consist of individuals with the same tastes: homogeneous 
clubs. 
Much of the literature has been devoted to normative issues. By allowing the number 
of clubs to vary the models have addressed the issue of optimal club size and, hence, the 
optimal number of clubs in the economy. Obviously, models which have a predetermined 
number of clubs cannot address club size optimality. But both models can address the optimal 
level of the club good and the optimal size of the club. The optimal level of the club good is 
determined by equating the marginal cost of producing the club good with the marginal benefit 
to consumers, summed over all the club members (i.e. the Samuelson condition for a public 
good). The form of the membership condition varies with the structure of the model. In 
general, membership is determined by equating the net benefit of the added individual of being 
included in the club with the marginal cost of adding the member to members, summed over 
all members. In variable-use models, a third condition is produced which determines the 
optimal level of use. This condition equates the marginal benefit of use for a single member 
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with the total cost of the additional visit summed over all members, including the member 
whose marginal benefit is considered. 
A competitive market mechanism can produce these optimal levels in both 
homogeneous clubs (see Berglas [1976b]) and heterogeneous clubs (see Sandler and 
Tschirhart [1984]). Consequently, these models have addressed the concern raised by 
Samuelson (1954) that "no decentralized pricing system can serve to determine optimally" (p. 
388) the level of a pure public good. Thus, the models formalized the contention of Tiebout 
who pointed out that although Samuelson's statement was true for federal public 
expenditures, it need not be true of local public expenditures. Models that have contributed to 
an understanding of the optimality of clubs under a decentralized system include Berglas 
(1976a, 1976b, 1981), Ng (1973, 1974), Roadway (1980), Berglas and Pines (1980), Sandler 
and Tschirhart (1980, 1981, 1984), Scotchmer and Wooders (1987b), Schwab and Oates 
(1991), McGuire( 1974, 1991). 
Models, which impose a predetermined number of clubs, have had a significant 
influence on the regional science literature. These models assume that a planner or nature or 
some force outside the influence of the conmiunity determined the number of shared goods in 
the economy. This feature is prominent in the models relevant to regional science, including 
those found in Flatters, Hendersen and Mieskowski (1974), Henderson (1994), Helpman and 
Pines (1980) and Helpman (1978). In this vein of the literature, two clubs are typically 
assumed which represent two government jurisdictions like cities, counties or states. This 
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assumption allows the model to shed light on the effects of local public goods on commodity 
and factor movements, and the distribution of the population. 
The models that have only a portion of the population as members of clubs were 
perhaps the last to be understood. Misunderstandings about these models' persisted some 
time after many issues were resolved. The ensuing discourse revealed the necessity of a total 
economy perspective (one which includes the utility of the members who are excluded from 
the club) versus a within-club perspective (one which includes only the utility of club members 
in the objective function). 
The models that partition the entire population into clubs contributed to our 
understanding of what has become known as the integer problem. These models, particularly 
Berglas (1976b), were used to demonstrate that competition among clubs supported an 
efficient outcome provided that the size of the optimal (homogeneous) club divided evenly 
into the total population. That is, the population needed to be an integer multiple of the 
optimal club size. If this condition did not hold, a member of the club of suboptimal size 
could bid his way into an optimally sized club, resulting in the expulsion of one member who 
could bid his way into another club in the same maimer. 
Basic Features and Implications of a Club Input 
Much of what follows in this section mirrors the results of published work. However, in 
order to introduce and motivate the model in the next section several general results in the 
' See the comments in Helpman and Hillman (1977) about Ng (1973) and the comments in 
Sandler (1984) about Berglas, Helpman and Pines (1982). 
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literature will be rederived here in a production context. The production model which undergirds 
the proposed research includes a partially rivaL, excludable input (i.e. irrigation^) in precisely the 
same manner as some published consumption models have included a partially rivaL, excludable 
consumption good. The models, though, are not perfectly symmetrical. Rederivation of general 
results is necessary to determine precisely where the symmetry foils. This will be accomplished as a 
byproduct of the two primary objectives of this section: establish the analytical model of the 
dissertation and demonstrate the ways in which the model coincides with those in the literature. In 
order to accomplish both objectives the discussion that follows alternately addresses features of the 
model and connections with the literature. 
Consider a production function that has private input x which might be considered 
labor, and another input r which might be considered irrigation services and which is 
excludable and at least partially non-rival. The non-rival features of the input are captured in a 
congestion function that depends positively on the total usage of the input r in a given region 
and negatively on the level of facilities which are uniquely associated with the provision of the 
input r. The congestion fiinaion can be written as c(r + 7,Z) where Z is the level of facilities 
and r is the aggregate level of usage of the input in the region less the amount r which is used 
by the producer. The theory developed so far requires that the partial derivative with respect 
" It should be emphasized that club models have not yet been applied to irrigation. An 
elaborately constructed model will not only reveal differences with the club good model but 
also bridge the conceptual gap between club theory and irrigation. 
to the first argument (r + r) is positive (Cr > 0) and the partial derivative with respect to the 
second argument is negative (cz < 0). 
Congestion functions have appeared elsewhere in the literature related to impure public 
goods. Models that embed a congestion function in a utility function can be found in Deserpa 
(1978), Oakland (1972) and Sandler and Tschirhart (1980). Models that embed a congestion 
function in a resource constraint can be found in Berglas and Pines (1981) and McGuire (1974). 
The seminal model by Buchanan (1965) contains congestion in both the utility fimction and the 
resource constraint. Although they analyzed only the Buchanan model, Adams and Royer (1977) 
derive generalizable results regarding the income and substitution effects of a change in the price of 
the club good on the amount of the club good and on the size of the club. Their results imply that 
the manner with which congestion enters the model carries with it implications on the income and 
substitution effects of variables affecting congestion. Thus, some care should be taken with the 
specification of congestion in the production model. In the current model it is assumed that the 
effects of congestion on production may be completely oflfeet by increasing other inputs. This 
would not be the case if congestion entered the model as a fixed cost. 
As others have noted (Blumel, Pethig and von dem Hagen [1986]), the form of the 
congestion function used here implies that the congestion effects are symmetric in the sense that the 
congestion created by a unit of use of the club input by one individual is indistinguishable from the 
congestion created by a unit of use of the club input by any other individual. Others regard these 
effeas as anonymous rather than synunetric, drawing attention to the consequences on strategic 
behavior (Scotchmer and Wooders [1987b]). 
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In irrigation, congestion may occur via costs or production. In the previous section three 
stories were used to describe the possible ways congestion is associated with irrigation. These 
three and at least three additional stories can be told to elaborate on congestion in irrigation. First, 
the story was told of excessive upstream water use which reduced irrigation opportunities for 
downstream irrigators. In this story, congestion is represented by an additional cost to the 
producer due, for instance, to the increased amount of energy required to apply a given amount of 
water to the plot. 
Second, the existence of a single point source for irrigation produces queuing by farmers 
for the irrigation services. In this story, congestion is represented by waiting costs or scheduling 
costs or inconvenience costs. 
Third, by recycling lower quality irrigation services into the public irrigation source 
producers fece lower output levels with increased public use. In this story, congestion is 
represented by an input into the production fimction. 
Fourth, the broader notion of water control which includes but is not limited to water 
application to the plot appears in the irrigation literature as the factor which increases agricultural 
production (Trung [1978], Wickham and Valera [1978]). Increased water control increases the 
probability of achieving the target yield. Although the 6rmer may utiUze the same amount of 
irrigation services, yields may, nevertheless, decrease if he cannot drain his field in a timely manner 
because, say, other farmers flood the drainage ditch. 
Fifth, use by others of the irrigation system increases the number of stress days, a term used 
by Wickham and Valera (1978) to denote the number of continuous days greater than 3 in which 
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the plot had no standing water. Prolonged dryness which is associated with stress days results in 
soil cracking which increases the minimum water requirement for rice (Tabbai and Wickham 
[1978]). Thus, use by others of the irrigation system diminishes on average the productivity of the 
water applied to the plot. 
Sixth, and related to the fourth and fifth, plot-to-plot drainage systems, which are common 
in Southeast Asia, not only reduce water control for lower elevation farmers but also provide lower 
quality water for lower elevation formers. Regarding the former effect, Wickham and Valera 
(1978) found that in three Philippine provinces the number of stress days inaeased at an average 
rate of 1.4 days per 100 meters of distance fi-om Ae turnout (irrigation source). The average 
distance fi-om the turnout was nearly 250 meters so that the average additional stress days was 3.5 
which is associated with a reduction in rice yields of 0.1 to 0.3 tons per hectare (Wickham and 
Valera [1978], p. 65). 
A convenient way to model each of these irrigation stories is to include congestion in the 
production flmction. By doing so, congestion will have both income and substitution implications. 
Alternatively, allowing congestion to augment only the resource constraint eliminates the 
substitution possibilities between congestion and other inputs. Thus irrigation is modeled most 
generally when congestion enters both the production function and the resource constraint. 
Note that the inherent asymmetrical effects on congestion by the agents in the preceding 
stories is assumed away in the congestion flmction of the form c(r + f ,Z). A more general form 
is C|j(ri,r2,r3,...,rs_i,r5,Z) where k denotes the kth farm household in the set of s farm 
households. Although not as general, the symmetric form seems imminently appropriate for 
irrigation use since the production effects of congestion arise mainly as a result of the amount 
of irrigation usage and not the use for which irrigation is demanded. Whether the irrigating 
household is large or small, livestock producing or grain producing, rich or poor has no effect 
on congestion apart from the derived demand for irrigation services. Consequently, the 
synunetrical form is assumed throughout the analysis. 
Let the production function be written as f(x, r,c(r + r,Z)) where f(.) is assumed to 
be strictly quasiconcave in x, r and -c. Therefore, fx > 0 > f« and fr > 0 > f^ but ^ < 0. 
Applying what we know about the congestion function, we theorize that dfldJ = £; c^ < 0 and 
dVdZ = fc cz > 0. That r (irrigation) enters into the production function is consistent with the 
rival features of r. The fact that the congestion function depends on the aggregate usage of r is 
consistent with non-rival features of r. Thus, the input r is said to be partially non-rival (or 
partially rival). It is important to note that a particular producer's usage of a unit of r reduces 
the production possibilities of other producers. Combined with excludability this feature 
defines a particular type of club input. 
Analogous features define club goods. Sandler and Tschirhart (1980) define a club as "a 
voluntary group deriving mutual benefit fi^om sharing one or more of the following: production 
costs, the members' characteristics, or a good characterized by excludable benefits" (p. 1482). 
Thus, in their definition excludability, more than non-rivalry, characterizes club goods. On the 
other hand Pauly (1970) defines a club as "a group of persons who share in the consumption of a 
good which is not purely private, not wholly divisible among persons" (p. 53,54), emphasizing the 
non-rival features of the club good although excludability is implied in many of his proofs. Also, 
Buchanan (1965) in the seminal article on club theory considered goods which are neither purely 
public nor purely private. Thus, the Buchanan model may also be viewed as one which allows both 
excludability and non-rivalry as features of the club good. The current production model maintains 
both features of ©ccludability and non-rivaliy, making it consistent with many of the models that 
appear in the literature. 
Excludability provides that the users of the input r can be restricted to a subset of the 
population with little or no cost. The congestion that occurs from usage of r is experienced 
only by those who have not refused or been excluded from access to r. The population of 
producers is comprised of two mutually exclusive sets: one group (referred to hereafter as 
"the club" or as "the club producers") uses r and also observes a reduction in produaion due 
to congestion, the other group does not use r and observes no reduction in production due to 
congestion. 
With this framework, it is possible to examine conditions of production efficiency that 
apply to the entire population of producers. That is, I will take a total economy perspective 
that is similar in spirit to Oakland (1972), Ng (1973) and Sandler and Tschirhart (1980). 
Moreover, I will assume that a single club exists in the community and that the population is 
divided between a set of club members belonging to the same club and non-club members. This 
scenario is identical to that ofBuchanan (1965), Oakland (1972), Sandler and Tschirhart (1980) 
and Comes and Sandler (1986). 
The following additional assumptions are necessary to simplify the analysis. First, let 
the production technologies of each of the producers be identical. Second, let s denote the 
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number of club producers and let s be the total number of producers in the economy so that 
s - s is the number of producers for whom the input r has been refused. Third, let the trade­
offs in the economy between the private input x and the facilities that provide the input r be 
captured in the transformation function G(XZ,s) = 0 where X is the total amount of private 
input available to producers and Z is the level of the facilities through which the club input r is 
provided. 
The transformation function used here follows other models in which the 
transformation function G(X,Z) is augmented by the club size, s.'' In this way, maintenance 
costs are accounted for which are due to an increased burden on the club facilities. Such costs 
might include additional labor to distribute the benefits of the coop or to service irrigation 
outlets that deteriorate fi^om heavy use. On the other hand, for the case of irrigation in 
Vietnam where large portions of the population irrigate, one might also conceive of ways in 
which labor is freed up by a larger club size. Specifically, the costs of excluding non-members 
fi^om irrigation diminishes dramatically as the club size approaches the size of the population. 
Consequently, there may be a reduction in maintenance costs for a larger coop. Thus, it is not 
clear how maintenance costs are affected by club size in the case of Vietnamese irrigation 
cooperatives. By assuming that maintenance costs can be passed on to the member by a lump 
sum transfer of either cash or labor, there is no need at all to allow s to affect G(X,Z). 
" See Sandler and Tschirhart (1984), Berglas (1976a), Berglas, Helpman and Pines (1982) and 
Comes and Sandler (1986), pages 165, 171 and 188. 
Presumably, a similar argument underlies models that neglect the affect of s.* Nevertheless, 
for the sake of generality, I will account for both resource costs and individual congestion 
costs that result from increased membership size. 
Under these assumptions the optimal allocation of x across producers, the optimal 
level of r for the club producers, the optimal level of Z and the optimal club size, s, can be 
determined by solving the following problem 
max sf(x,r,c(sr,Z)) s.t. 
x,r,Z,s,x,X 
a) (s-s)[f(x,0,0)-Q] = 0 
(|i) X-sx-(s-s)x = 0 
(y) G(X,Z,S) = 0 
where the Greek letters in parentheses represent the Lagrangean multipliers for each of the 
constraints. The derivatives of the Lagrangean with respect to the choice variables imply the 
following (assuming an interior solution): 
x; sfx - S|i = 0 
x; (s - s)A.fj. - (s - s)|a = 0 
X; |i - yGx = 0 
r: sfr + s^f^c^ = 0 
Z; sf^Cy - yG^ = 0 
s; f + sfcCjr - X.f - ia(x - x) - yGg = 0 
where f and f^ refer to the non-club producer's level of production and marginal product of 
the private input, respectively, evaluated at the optimal levels. These equations imply the 
following efficiency conditions'; 
* See Oakland (1974), Berglas, Helpman and Pines (1982), Sandler (1984) and Comes and 
Sandler (1986), pages 177 and 180. 
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(1) sc^MRTScx = MRT^x [provision] 
(2) MRTSpj = MRTScx(-CrS) [toil] 
f f . (3) — - —+(x - x) = -srCrMRTScx + MRTjx [membership size] 
^x 
where MRTSct is the marginal rate of technical substitution of production congestion for the 
private input. Because congestion affects production negatively this marginal rate of technical 
substitution is a negative value as is cz so that the left side of (I) is positive. MRTzx is the 
marginal rate of transformation of the club input facilities for the private input. In other 
words, MRTz.\- is the marginal cost of the club input facilities in units of the private input. 
Thus, in equation (I) the left hand side is the marginal benefit to all of society of the facilities 
which provide the club input and the right side is the marginal cost to society of constructing 
facilities which provide the club input. When the right side is equal to the left side the level of 
the facilities is at the optimal level (if (2) and (3) are also satisfied). Equation (1) is properly 
interpreted as the Samuelson condition and is similar to the condition derived by Sandmo 
(1972). 
Similarly, in (2) the right side is the sum of the marginal costs of employing the club 
input on the rest of society and the left side is the marginal benefit for the individual club 
producer of employing the club input. When these two sides are equal to one another the 
level of employment of the club input is at its optimal level (if (I) and (3) are also satisfied). 
Note that in both (1) and (2) the marginal cost of congestion in production (MRTScx) is 
^ Analogs of these conditions for a consumption model can be found in Comes and Sandler 
(1986, p. 177), Sandler and Tschirhart (1980, p. 1489) and Sandler (1984, p. 63). 
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multiplied by the number of producers in the club, s. This is analogous to the Samuelson 
condition of a public good in which the eflScient level of provision of a public good is reached 
when the marginal cost of providing the good is equated with the sum, over all agents deriving 
some benefit from the public good, of the marginal benefits. 
Equation (3) is rather innocuous and one needs to have in mind the marginal producer who 
is indifferent between joining the club of producers and not joining the club. Because all 
production technologies are identical in this model, the only thing that distinguishes the marginal 
producer fi-om the rest is the state of the economic environment when the participation decision is 
made. The marginal producer balances the costs and benefits of participating in a club whose 
membership is s. The left side of (3) is the net increase in output that results fi'om participation in 
the club, evaluated in terms of the marginal productivity of the private input, plus the net reduction 
of the private input that results fi^om participation in the club. Recall that participation in the club 
provides access to the excludable input r which contributes positively to production. The degree of 
substitutability between x and r will affect the net gains of participation for the marginal producer 
represented by the two terms on the left side of equation (3). The first term on the right side is the 
cost of increased congestion imposed on all the ether members of the club fi'om the acceptance of 
one more member (who uses r units of the club input) into the club. The second term on the right 
side is the cost of distributing the services to one more member. Consequently, the benefits for one 
individual are balanced against the costs of distribution of the services plus the costs imposed on all 
the other members in the club when the decision of accepting an additional member is evaluated. 
The optimal size of the club is obtained when the social cost of an additional member equals the 
benefit of joining for that member. 
Combining (1) and (2) we get 
(4) MRTSrx = -Cr(sMRTScx) = MRTzx 
Cz V Cz ; 
In a competitive economy in which r (and not just x) is a private good the following is the 
analogous eflBciency condition. 
(5) MRTSp, = MRTzx 
Thus, policy makers who incorrectly perceive r to be an excludable and entirely rival input 
will make the mistake of adopting lassez-faire policies. That is, the result of lassez-faire policies 
(equation (5)) does not match the condition of efficiency. This unpleasant consequence occurs 
whenever a market does not exist for a valued good or input. In this case, irrigation has external 
effects on other farmers which are not reflected in the prices resulting from a competitive market 
for irrigation. In other words, with an input that is merely partially rival a market failure results, 
justifying market intervention to achieve production eflBciency. Note that the degree of 
intervention depends on the technology of congestion (i.e. the values of the partial derivatives, Cr 
and Cz) as is evident from equation (4). Note also that where the partials are equal, a 
competitive outcome is eflficient because the marginal effects of facilities and aggregate 
irrigation are offsetting; congestion is minimized. 
Equation (4) establishes the fact that in this economy a liberalized market for the input r 
cannot, in general, support an eflficient outcome and that an institution other than a market 
institution may be desirable. Of course, failure of any of equations (1) to (3) will also produce 
ineflficiencies. 
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Optimizing Behavior of Households 
In this section, the incentive structure of household production units will be examined. The 
analysis requires various assumptions on the costs and benefits of production. For now, consider 
the assumptions that are consistent with competitive market conditions. Specifically, assume that 
the household takes as given the output price, P, the private input price, W, and the club input 
price, T. Regarding the latter, one should note that market power in the hands of the collective 
decision-making unit does not necessarily confer market power to individual decision-making units. 
By assuming excludability in the club input r, the fi'amework of a single club permits 
monopolization of r. The price, T, of the club input is then a price that the club assesses on its own 
members which reflects the club's market power. It is assumed here that the individual member 
cannot afifect the level of this price either through voting or purchasing the club input. This 
assumption is quite reasonable for large clubs that have little tolerance for an uneven distribution of 
power, as is typical in cooperatives in Vietnam. In addition, both the level of club facilities, Z, and 
the aggregate level of club input usage by all the other club producers, r , is invariant to decisions 
by the household. That Z is exogenous corresponds with an important aspect of irrigation which 
was discussed previously. Specifically, it was noted that households and even rural communities in 
Vietnam had no part in the decision involving the production of the irrigation infi-astructure. The 
model below attempts to capture the distribution of the available irrigation services to individual 
households and the behavior of individual households when their incentives are property modeled. 
The household solves the following optimization problem. 
7c(P,W,T;Z, r) = max Pf(x,r,c(r+r,Z))-Wx-Tr 
x,r 
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where the prices - P, W, and T - as well as the variables Z and r are exogenous to the producer. 
The first order conditions for the club producer are; 
x:  Pfx-W = 0 => (Fl)  Pfx=W 
r P(fr + fcCr)-T = 0 => (F2) P(fr + fcCr) = T 
Consequently, it is possible to solve for the actual demands for both the club input and the 
private input as fimctions of 7. In particular, 
r = r(P,W,T;Z, r) 
x = x(P,W,T;Z,r) 
The individual's optimal usage of the club input is determined without considering the 
congestion imposed on the other members of the club. This is representative of Nash behavior in 
that the individual producer takes the decisions of others as given and invariant with respect to his 
own decisions. However, the individual producer takes into account the increased congestion on 
his own production that results fi^om his own input decisions. 
Recall that T represents a "visitation" or user charge. Suppose that a membership charge 
(say, the cost share, C(Z,s)/s, where C(Z,$) is the cost of providing the irrigation services given 
facility size Z and membership size s) replaced this fee so that irrigation expenditure (Tr) was 
replaced with a fixed cost in the household's profit function. In this case, (F2) is replaced with 
(F2') P(fr + fcCr) = 0. 
The household irrigates until its marginal benefit in doing so is zero. This situation is 
sometimes called the tragedy of the commons since it results in the overexploitation of the 
resource- irrigation, in this case. Thus, efficiency requires that a per-use fee be assessed on 
households. 
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For completeness, consider the non-club producer. Let the non-club producer solve the 
following maximization problem. 
7c(P, W) = m^ Pf(x,0,0) - Wx 
X 
which has the first order necessary condition 
x;  Pf^-W = 0 => (F3) Pf^=W 
Again, the non-club producer takes as given the prices P and W. 
It should be emphasized that the costs of producing the club fecilities, Z, are not bom by 
the club member. The members take as given the level of facilities which provide them the club 
input. This feature is particularly appropriate in the present context of irrigation since not only 
households, but whole communities take as given the level and type of irrigation infi-astructure that 
services the community (see, for example. Small, Bruns and Herklots [1993]). Furthermore, the 
costs of the irrigation system are not bom in any direct manner by the communities. 
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CHAPTER III. CONSUMPTION PATTERNS IN MEMBER-OWNED 
PRODUCER CLUBS 
Until now the model has only treated production aspects of the club producers. In this 
section consumption possibilities are included so that the model can address issues relevant to 
a household which produces a marketable commodity utilizing its own endowment of a 
productive resource and buys on the market a consumable good. 
Extending the model in this way makes it similar in many respects to the basic labor supply 
model of agricultural households (see, for example, HuflBnan (1980), Rosenzweig (1980), HuflBnan 
and Lange (1989), HuflBnan (1991), HuflBnan and Tokle (1994) and Tokle and HuflBnan (1991)). 
These models typically treat the inputs to agricultural production as entirely private, i.e. My rival 
and excludable. Because the model developed in the previous section incorporates a partially non-
rival input, the model extension will raise issues not previously examined in the literature related to 
labor supply decisions of farm households. 
These issues are divided into two groups: normative issues related to eflBcient allocation of 
resources and positive issues related to comparative statics. The normative analysis extends the 
general equilibrium model in Chapter II to address top level eflBciency as well as production 
eflficiency. The positive analysis is organized as a set of propositions. 
Normative Analysis 
Including consumption adds considerable complexity to the eflBciency problem. Typically, 
eflficiency is described in three parts. I) Production eflBciency occurs when the productive 
resources in the economy are allocated among productive processes in such a way that no change 
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in the allocation can take place without decreasing the output of one of the production units. 2) 
Exchange eflBciency occurs when the goods produced in the economy are allocated among 
consumers in such a way that no change in the allocation can take place without making one of the 
consumers worse off. 3) Top level eflBciency occurs when the eflBcient allocation of productive 
resources results in marginal tradeoflfe that exactly coincide with the marginal tradeoffs of the 
eflScient allocation of the output of those resources among consumers. 
In the typical Walrasian model (see, for example, the treatment in Varian [1992, chapter 
18] or the more mathematical treatment in Arrow and Hahn [1971]), resource owners are free to 
choose among several production techniques to which they may sell their resources. This is not the 
case in the present model of a club input. That is, the production technique for club producers is 
not the same as that for the non-club producers, nor is it available to the non-club producers. 
Consequently, the population is divided with respect to consumption as well as resource allocation 
and production. In the following model, y is a homogeneous consumable good produced either by 
club producers or by non-club producers. Also, xi represents leisure, the amount of the private 
input which is not used in production. The total endowment of the private input in the 
economy is given by X. The distribution of X across individuals is determined endogenously 
in this model. 
Regional efnciency 
As before, the model assumes identical preferences and technologies making it an 
extension of the model of a homogeneous club. In this context, the central planner desires to 
maximize the total utility of the economy. Consistent with the presence of a club, there are in this 
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economy club members and non-members. Because members and non-members have the same 
utility and production functions they differ in utility and production levels only because of 
differences in consumption and input biondles. To make this difference explicit, non-member 
variables will be denoted with a hat ( x, for example) while member choice variables will not have 
any additional mark (i.e. x). In this economy, two uses of time (x) are possible. First, time may be 
allocated to a production process which results in the creation of a consumable good, y. This use is 
denoted as x. Second, time may be consumed directly as leisure, denoted as X|. As before, the 
total number of agents in the economy is s, the total endowment of time available to the 
economy is X, and the transformation function which maps X to a level of irrigation facilities, 
Z, is given as G(X,Z,s), where the dependence on maintenance costs has been made explicit. 
The top level eflBciency conditions are determined from the following optimization problem. 
which has the following first order conditions 
y.  sUy -  s^ = 0 
y; ( i  - s)Uy - (s - s)A. = 0 
x; sXf^ - sji = 0 
x: (s - s)Xf- (s - s)}i = 0 
xp sUi -  s|a = 0 
xj; (s-s)Ui-(s-s)|i = 0 
X; - yGx = 0 
max sU(y,xi)+ (s-s)U(y,.xi) s.t. 
x,x,,x,x,,y, 
y,r,Z,s,X 
( X )  sf(x, r,c(sr,Z)) + (s - s)f(x,0,0) 
- sy - (s - s)y = 0 
(ji) X-s(x + xi)-(s-s)(x + xi)  = 0 
(Y) G(X,Z,s) = 0 
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r X(sfr + s^fgCr) = 0 
Z; X-sfgCx - yGz = 0 
s: U - U + A.(f + sfcCfT - f - y + y) - |i(x - x + xi - xi) - yGJ = 0 
From these conditions one obtains equations (1) and (2), the provision and toll conditions 
of productive eflBciency. In addition, the following conditions are obtained. Equations (1) and (2) 
are reproduced for completeness. 
(1) sc^MRTScx = MRT2X 
(2) MRTS„ = MRTScx(-CrS) 
(12.1) MRS = MRS 
(12.2) i - (y - y) + f^[^ - i + src^MRTScx - MRT^x - (x - x) - (xi - x,)] = 0 
Uy Uy f^  
Similar to the Walrasian model, exchange eflBciency occurs in this model indicated by 
(12.1). Note that (12.2) replaces (3) as the membership condition. The condition (12.2) expresses 
optimal membership in terms of the private consumption good, y. Comparing (12.2) and (3), it is 
apparent that (3) is neither necessary nor suflBcient for top-level eflBciency in this model. In general, 
the optimal club size for production efficiency is not the same as the optimal club size for top-level 
efficiency when the club is one which shares a public input. Membership involves costs and 
benefits to club members that go beyond production considerations. There are consumption 
considerations as well which affect the optimal membership size. The direct afifect of club 
membership on production may be viewed as only the first level of consequences on the Pareto 
optimal conditions. These production consequences have ramifications on the optimal 
consumption bundle as well, establishing a more complicated interdependency among optimal 
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consumption bundles, optimal production bundles and optimal club size. This is an important 
result that demonstrates the precise way in which producer clubs differ from consumer clubs. 
Recall that (3) is perfectly symmetric with the corresponding eflBciency condition for a 
consumer club. That is, the top-level eflBciency conditions, which arise when a consumption good 
is shared, look identical to the production eflBciency conditions, which arise when an input is 
shared. But this is where the similarities end. When an input is shared (i.e. in a producer club) 
other eflBciency conditions must be accounted for. In particular, exchange eflBciency (equation 
12.1) and top-level eflBciency must also occur. The deviation of (12.2) from published results 
confirms the intuition that in a general equilibrium, the symmetry between a club good and a club 
input is lost. 
To reiterate, top level eflBciency with a club good is symmetric only with production 
eflBciency of a club input. Top level eflBciency conditions with a club input cannot be replicated 
with a club good. Thus, it matters a great deal whether the shared good affects consumption 
directly or indirectly through a production relation. 
Equation (12.2) can be rewritten in terms of the private input as 
(12.3) ^ u u 
u,. Uv 
+ -^[(f-y)-(f-y)]  + (x + xi)-(x + x,)  = -srCfMRTScx + MRTsx 
To interpret this expression one needs to have in mind the marginal member who faces an 
environment such that the private benefits of joining the club are exactly oflfset by the marginal 
production costs incurred on all the other members by including another individual in the club plus 
the marginal resource costs of club size. The first term (in brackets) represents the gain in utility (in 
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terms of marginal utility) for the marginal member of joining the club. The second term (in 
brackets) represents the gain in surplus of household production that results from joining the club. 
The last two terms represent the reallocation of labor between club members and non-members 
that is necessary to equate the marginal product of labor and the marginal benefit of leisure 
between the two groups. 
Note that the first two terms are weighted by the unit labor requirement (i.e. the inverse of 
the marginal product of labor). These two bracketed terms are the analogs of terms that would 
appear in the membership condition of a consumer club. As in a model of a club good, the net 
benefit of the marginal club member has a utility component and a "compensating variation" 
component' which is denominated in terms of the good that is directly consumed. 
The last two terms represent a complicated mixture of balancing effects. Note that the 
marginal product of labor is equalized between club producers and non-club producers. This must 
be the case for an eflBcient aUocation of labor. If fxc > 0, then increased membership in the club 
boosts labor productivity such that a transfer of labor is necessary from non-members to 
members in order to equate the marginal product of labor between included and excluded 
households. So, x - x > 0. This effect may be aided or abated by congestion effects. That 
is, if fxc < 0 and membership in the club carries with it the adverse imposition of congestion on 
' Hillman and Swan (1983) interpret y - y as compensating variation since in their model it is 
the amount of the reduction in the club members consumption of the private good that 
reduces utility to the level of a non-member. While Comes and Sandler (1986, p. 178) 
question the consistency of the model, I use the term "compensating variation" only to 
provide a conceptual handle for the readers who are familiar with the term. 
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production, then the amount of labor transferred is less than it would be if the club had no 
congestion. 
The transfer of labor is associated with a dififerential in production between club and 
non-club members. In addition, note that the private input (labor) is directly consumed as 
leisure and the privately produced good is also directly consumed. EfiRciency requires that the 
marginal rates of substitution be equal across both club members and non-members. 
Consequently, both y and xi may also be different between club and non- club members in 
order to sustain the equality of the marginal rates of substitution.^ To reiterate: when a 
member joins the club, maintenance of the efficiency conditions (specifically (12.1) and 
fx = fx) requires a reallocation of resources which can be expressed in real terms as part of 
the net benefit that accrues to the added member. 
Note also that in (12.3) the unit labor requirement translates the terms expressed in 
units of the private good (y) into units of the private input (x) which then can be directly 
interpreted as the net benefit for the marginal member. In this way, labor productivity plays a 
direct role in the determination of the optimal club size as it augments the net benefit of 
membership, vis-a-vis non-membership, for the directly consumed good. Thus, for high labor 
productivity, the reallocation of labor may represent the entire net benefit for the marginal 
member. 
• In order to make y = y and xj = xj, one may wish to assume U = U. Although Berglas, 
Helpman and Pines (1982) showed that in a club good model this assumption implies that 
there is no exclusion in the efficient allocation, it is doubtful that their proof can be applied to 
the model presented here. 
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The individual household's problem 
Having compared the eflBciency conditions with those derived in Chapter II, I will also 
compare the utility maximizing conditions of a household with those of the profit maximization 
problem discussed in Chapter II. Many features of the previous model of individual optimization 
are retained including the exogeneity of Z and 7, the exogeneity of prices (including the price for 
the club input), the form of the production fiinction and the role of cost-sharing. There are, 
however, several new features introduced in this model, including a utility fiinction, a labor market, 
two-tier pricing of the club input, and a differentiation between the produced good and the 
consumed good. The result is a model that links club theory with household production theory. 
Recall that, in the previous model of individual optimization, the household takes as given 
the level of the irrigation facilities (Z) and the rate of usage of all of the other club members (7). 
This assumption acknowledged the fact that the decision to provide the facilities and the decisions 
of other producers are b^^ond the influence of the individual household. For much the same 
reason, the size of the club (s) is exogenous. Also, the household is a price taker as before in all 
markets, including the market for the club input. The production fionction has the same features as 
before, including strict quasiconcavity. The cost sharing motive, which has already been repeatedly 
discussed, appears in this model. 
In contrast to the previous model of individual optimization, a strictly quasiconcave utility 
fiinction is included, the maximization of which represents the household's objective. Recall that in 
the previous model the household was only concerned with the maximization of money income. 
As it will be shown later, utility maximization in this model encompasses profit maximization. The 
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household derives utility from the consumption of a private good (denoted y) which is purchased in 
a competitive market for price V. Also, the household derives utility from leisure which is secured 
out of the household's endowment of labor, or time, as the two are conceptually indistinct in this 
model. 
The model expressly admits a competitive labor maricet from which the household may 
obtain wage income at the market wage (denoted W). The household must determine the optimal 
allocation of the labor endowment (X) across three distina uses: household production (or on-
farm labor, denoted x), wage income (or off-ferm labor, denoted x™), and leisure (denoted xi). 
The presence of a competitive labor market has important consequences on the theoretical 
form of the optimal solution. In particular, the solution becomes non-recursive in a sense that 
will be formalized later. 
For the sake of generality, it is supposed that the coop utilizes a fee structure that 
includes a fine component and a coarse component. The fine component is a fee (denoted T) 
that is assessed on a per-unit or per-visit basis. Specifically, households are assessed the 
charge, T, for every day (or hour or cubic meter) of use of the irrigation services. The coarse 
component is a fee assessed on a seasonal basis. Specifically, households are assessed the 
charge (denoted C(Z,s)/s) for every season they wish to receive irrigation services. As was 
demonstrated earlier, the fine component is necessary in order to obtain efficiency. The 
coarse component may be relied upon to cover the fixed costs of the producer club. 
The nature of the private consumable good (y) deserves special comment. This model 
follows others in the macroeconomics literature, in which aggregate consumption is depicted as a 
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single good. In this way, y is an index of all consumption goods. Similarly, the price of y (denoted 
V) is a price index of consumption goods. It is natural, then, to think of the household produced 
good as distinct from the private consumable good. Consequendy, the price of the household 
produced good (denoted P) differs from V. In some cases, it may be desirable to model explicitly 
household consumption out of production, which can be accomplished in this model by restricting 
the price of the consumable good to equal the price of the produced good. Thus, the model 
presented contains a model of marketed surplus as a special case. 
Under these assumptions the agent solves the following maximization problem. 
Note that (Ml) and (M3) imply (Fl) and that (M2) is identical to (F2). The production 
decisions are identical to those in the model where consumption was not included. Thus, 
optimization of production as was presented in Chapter U is implied by the consumption model. 
Utility maximization implies profit maximization in this model. 
Now note that in the consumption model under market conditions the consumption pattern 
of the household depends only on the real wage. Assuming an interior solution, condition (M3) 
X = X + X[ + Xjn 
max 
y,x,r,x_,x. Pf(x,r ,c(r+r,Z))-Tr-^^^^ + Wxni = Vy 
s 
After substituting for y and xi the first order conditions are; 
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equates the real wage (WAO with the marginal rate of substitution of leisure with the consumable 
good. Also, condition (Ml) equates the real wage with the real value of the marginal product of 
labor. So long as the real wage is exogenous, which is consistent with an interior solution (x™ > 0), 
the optimal consumption pattern which is determined by (M3) will be independent of the 
optimal production pattern which is determined by (Ml). Consequently, (Ml) to (M3) need 
not be solved simultaneously. However, (Ml) and (M2) must still be solved simultaneously to 
obtain the optimal levels of the production variables. In general, production decisions and 
consumption decisions are non-joint whenever a labor market exists. 
The problem for the non-club producer is less complicated and can be written formally 
as 
X = X + X| + Xm 
max U(y,xi) s.t. 
y,x,x^,x, " A + Pf(x,0,0) + Wxni = Vy 
The first order conditions for this problem are (F3) and (M4). 
Figure 3.1 is the picture normally associated with the agricultural household production 
models found in the literature. The locus of points which include B and B' represents the 
production possibility fi-ontier for the household. Specifically, an amount of on-farm labor 
(measured fi-om the right, i.e. fi"om O) has a one-to-one correspondence with an amount of the 
consumable good. The assumption of strict quasiconcavity in the production function implies that 
household production monotonically increases in on-farm labor with diminishing marginal returns. 
Units of household production may be expressed in units of the consumable good by multiplying by 
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y 
Xc 
Figure 3.1. Optimal consumption and production patterns 
the (exogenous) relative price so that the shape of the mapping between on-farm labor and the 
consumable good is the same as the shape of the production function. 
The locus of points which include C and C represents a set of consumption points among 
which the household is indifferent. Recall that utility depends only on consumption of the private 
good, y, and leisure, xi. With the assumption of strict quasiconcavity in the utility function, the 
marginal rate of substitution monotonically decreases along an indifference curve that is drawn 
in the first quadrant. Thus, Figure 3.1 depicts an indifference curve (CC) that is consistent 
with measurement of  leisure f i-om the left  ( i .e .  f rom 0 ' ) .  
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The horizontal axis marks off measures of labor (or time). The length of the line 
segment O'O represents the total endowment of labor for the household. Moving from 0' to 
the right is the direction of increasing leisure. Moving from O to the left is the direction of 
increasing on-farm labor. 
The line that connects N and B and passes through C represents the consumption 
possibility frontier. In this model consumption possibilities are expanded due to the labor 
market. That is, the household need not be constrained by the production possibilities set. 
Given that the household can earn the wage W by selling labor to the market, another means 
of earning income is available which expands the consumption set. The optimal allocation of 
on-farm and off-farm labor is determined by equating the returns on each. The return for off-
farm labor is simply the real wage so that on-farm labor will be provided until the marginal 
product of the on-farm labor equals the real wage. Thus, the slope of NB corresponds to the 
real  wage.  Optimali ty requires that  NB be tangent  to the production possibi l i ty frontier ,  B 'B.  
Given the consumption set defined by NB, the household chooses a combination of (y, 
xi) within this set such that household utility is maximized. This occurs when the slope of the 
indifference curve (i.e. the marginal rate of substitution) equals the slope of the consumption 
possibility frontier (i.e. the real wage). Thus, point C represents the optimal consumption 
bundle for the household given the consumption possibility set which depends on household 
production and the real wage. 
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Positive Anatysis 
The input decisions of households are sensitive to changes in the production possibility 
frontier. In particular, if the production function shifts up for all levels of production due, for 
instance, to an increase in the marginal productivity of the private input then B would shift to a 
point associated with a higher level of x. The budget constraint would shift out, the consumption 
possibility set would expand and the household would arrive at a higher utility level. 
Note that Figure 3.1 can also be employed with a club input. The shape of the production 
function is unchanged due to decreasing marginal productivity. In the household's production 
fimction [f(x,r,c(r+r ,Z))] several factors can affect the marginal product of the private input. In 
order to sign the effects it is necessary to impose a little more structure to the model. Specifically, 
assume that condition C1 holds. 
Condition CI: f^c <0 
Under C1 congestion adversely affects the marginal product of the private input, not just 
the level of output. It is not hard to imagine cases in which this condition holds. For example, 
when truckers encounter interstate congestion the consequent diminished speeds not only increase 
the amount of time necessary to deliver the load but also decrease fiiel eflBciency. More 
importantly, with regard to irrigation it has been noted in chapter I that congestion diminishes the 
productivity of irrigation. The logic extends in a natural way. Recall that use by others increases 
the number of stress days which increase the minimum water requirement to obtain target yields. 
In addition, stress days increase the labor required to apply the minimum water requirement. By 
diminishing returns to labor, labor productivity declines. 
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In order to focus attention on the leisure-labor consequences of a club input we assume for 
the moment that r is fixed for some period, say, by a contractual arrangement. Adopting this 
assumption leaves only one decision for the household: the proper allocation of labor between the 
market and household production and leisure. Under these conditions the following proposition is 
obtained. 
Proposition I -
If CI hoick then a) the amount of private input employed in household production increases 
(decreases) with increased (decreased) facilities and b) if in addition, the (consumable) private 
input is a normal good, then the amount of the private input supplied to the market decreases 
(increases) with increased (decreased) facilities. 
Proof 
To prove the proposition it will be usefiil to write the optimization problem in more 
femiliar terms. This is accomplished by substituting for Xm instead of for xi and not making any 
substitution for y. The individual optimization problem can then be written as 
max U(y,xi) s.t. F(x;r,T,Z,T,W,s,X) = Vy + Wxj 
y,x,Xj 
where F(x,r, r , Z,T,W,s,X) = Pf(x,r,c(r+-r , Z)) - Tr - + W(X-x), the fiill income of the 
s 
household. The first order conditions are 
(P.l) XFx = A.(Pfx-W) = 0 
( P 2 )  U y  - X V  =  0  
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(P3) UI-XW = 0 
(P.4) F(x,r, r,Z,T, W,s,X) = Vy + Wxi 
The optimal values of the choice variables can be written as 
x(W/P, r, r , Z) 
x,(P,V, F(x(W/P,r, r , Z),r, r , Z,T,W,s,X)) 
y(P,V, F(x(W/P, r, r , Z), r, r , Z,T,W,s,X)) 
Note that (P. 1) does not contain the other choice variables y and xi and that (P.2) and (P.3) 
do not contain the choice variable X. The system can be solved in blocks. Solving (P. 1) yields 
x(W/P, r, 7, Z) as the optimal value of employment of the private input in household production. 
The change in the optimal value of x given a change in any of the exogenous variables is obtained 
by totally differentiating (P. 1). 
W (Pi) fxxdx + fxi.dr + fxcCi.(dr + dr) + fxcC2dZ = dw ; where w = — 
Consequentiy, the partial derivative of the optimal level of employment of the private input 
in household production with respect to Z is 
^ _ ^XC^Z 
cL fxx 
where condition CI establishes the sign. 
The change in the optimal values of y and xi given a change in any of the exogenous 
variables is obtained by totally differentiating (P.2) and (P.3). However, a more straightforward 
approach to obtain the effect on xi due to changes in s and Z is to consider the Marshallian demand 
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of X| derived from the optimization problem. The partial derivative of the Marshallian demand of xi 
with respect to Z is 
To obtain a sign for the expression, first assume that the club's provision of the club good 
is at an eflBcient level. That is, suppose that the Samuelson condition holds so that sczMRTScx = 
MRTz.\-. This is equation (2). If the total costs of the club are denoted TC(Z,s) then sczPfc = 
oTC(Z,s)/oZ. A two-tier fee structure, which is included in this model, provides two means 
by which the total costs of the club may be covered. Consequently, it is supposed that the 
shared club costs (C(Z,s)), which are covered by a membership fee, represent only a portion 
of the total club costs (i.e. TC(Z,s) > C(Z,s)) and that 0TC(Z,s)/5Z > cC(Z,s)/5Z. The 
assumption that the Samuelson condition holds implies that sczPt > 5C(Z,s)/5Z. Thus, 
starting from an initial point where even Z is at an optimum (from the club's perspective) the term 
in the square brackets is positive as is the other term in the round brackets. The sign is established 
by the assumption that xi, leisure, is a normal good.^ The effect on the marketed amount of the 
private input, Xm, is then determined by the resource constraint associated with labor, the total 
derivative of which is 
(P.6) 0 = dx + dXjn + dxj 
This relation yields 
/ gC(Z,s)T 
PfcCz > 0 5xi _ 5xi 5F _ 0xi 5x ^ 
s 
) \ 
" Some empirical analyses support this assumption (see Gronau (1977)). 
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oL \dZ dZJ 
The proof is complete. Note that we have made use of four important assumptions to 
obtain this clean result; 1) a labor market, 2) fc < 0, 3) efficiency as a starting point, and 4) 
leisure is a normal good. 
These effects are presented graphically in Figure 3.2. Regarding the production 
effects, an increase in labor productivity shifts the B'B locus to a higher level. Facing a fixed 
wage (W), the household will increase its allocation of on-farm labor from X to X'. The 
y 
O' X O 
X' 
Figure 3.2. Optimal patterns given a change in Z 
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resulting increase in household income will allow the household to move to a higher level of 
utility. If leisure is a normal good, as is indicated in Figure 3.2, leisure will increase from OXc 
to OX^ . The remaining allocation of labor, market labor, will decrease. The reduction is 
represented by the narrower gap between X' and X^. 
Proposition 2 -
a) The amount ofprivate input employed in household production increases (decreases) 
as the size of the club decreases (increases). 
b) If the club size is larger than the size for which average shared costs are minimized 
and if in addition, the (consumable) private inpj4t is a normal good then the amount of the 
private input supplied to the market increases (decreases) with increased (decreased) club size. 
Proof: 
Note that x(W/P, r, r , Z) is not explicitly a function of s. However, it should be 
recognized that the exogenous variable r is related to the exogenous variable s. That is, it is 
supposed that the aggregate level of irrigation use by the other club members is positively related to 
the number of club members. Consequently, we can employ the relation r (s) where it is assumed 
that the derivative is positive. In this way, the optimal amount of on-farm labor depends indirectly 
on the club size via congestion. Using P.5 we can write 
which allows us to sign the club size effect on on-farm labor 
cx cyi cT 
—  =  — —  <  0  
cs cr cs 
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Now consider the club size effect on the household's optimal consumption of leisure. As 
before, club size only affects income so that we can write 
5xi _ 5xi dF _ OTj 5F 0x ^ 5F or ^ cF^ _ cxj 
cs cFds cpydxds cf ds dsJ cF 0 + PCrfc^; 1 cs sv 
CT ircC(Z,s) C(Z,s) 
cs 
<0 
The first term in the square brackets is zero by the first order conditions of the household 
optimization problem. The second term is negative, reflecting the adverse congestion 
consequences of a change in the club size. The third term, which is the expression in the round 
brackets, reflects the structure of the costs which are explicitly shared among the club members. 
The marginal membership effect of this fimction is compared to the average membership effect. 
Specifically, where the average shared cost is minimized, the expression is zero and optimal leisure 
is not affected by exogenous changes in the size of the club. If the club is larger than the size which 
minimizes the average shared costs of the club, the expression in the round brackets is positive. 
Taken together, these effects produce an inverse relationship between the optimal level of leisure 
and the size of the club. 
The effect of club size on off-farm labor is obtained via (P.6) which shows that 
m 
cs 
'^ CX CXi ,  ^
—+ ^ |  >0  
V cs cs 
The proof is complete. 
Proposition 2 forges a link between shared costs and labor supply. An increase in the size 
of the club has a direct effect on the aggregate level of congestion faced by the household which 
has adverse consequences on both the level of output and the marginal product of labor. However, 
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an increase in s has fevorable cost-sharing implications provided that the cost of adding another 
individual to the club (i.e. the marginal cost of membership) does not exceed that individual's share 
of the cost. In this case, there are only adverse consequences for the individual household of 
increasing membership. The optimizing household would allocate more labor to off-farm work. 
Proposition 3 -
If CI holds cmd f^ j. < 0. then 
a) the canount of private input employed in household production decreases (increases) with 
increased (decreased) use of the club input and 
b) if in addition, the (consumable) private input is normal and the club input is ovenitilized then 
the amount of the private input supplied to the market increases (decreases) with increased 
(decreased) use of the club input. 
Proof 
By(P.5) 
? =  +fxcCr )  <0  
cr f^x 
Also, 
^ ^ = ^(O + K + Pf,c, -Tl) < 0 
CT cF dr cF I CT cF ^ ^ 
Note that the first term in the round brackets is zero by the first order conditions of the 
individual optimization problem. If the use of the club input is at the optimal level prior to making 
an infinitesimal change then the second term (in the square brackets) is also zero and there are no 
effeas on leisure for an exogenous change in the club input. When the club input is ovenitilized. 
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the expression in square brackets is negative and an infinitesimal change m the club input results in 
a change in the opposite direction of the optimal level of leisure. 
By(P.6) 
5xnj _ fox ^ 
or vor or y 
> 0  
The proof is complete. 
Two aspects of this proposition should be noted. First, r is a fixed factor in this treatment 
and is of relevance only insofar as it increases output and labor productivity. Second, aggregate 
usage of the club input by the remaining club members is unchanged. The clean result of 
Proposition 3 cannot be maintained without these assumptions. 
Propositions 1 to 3 highlighted the labor-leisure consequences of a producer club, drawing 
exclusively on the club input features of the model while imposing the special assumption that r is a 
fixed factor. Specifically, comparative static results with respect to Z, s, and r - variables unique to 
a producer club- have been derived as propositions. Other comparative static results on labor 
supply have been derived for a number of real variables, including real farm price (P/V), and real 
labor wage (W/V) (Lange [1979]). These results as well as those represented by Propositions 1 to 
3 are summarized in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1 Summary of comparative static results 
An increase in ... 
household labor 
.. produces the following change in ... 
leisure  ^ market labor 
(+) (+) (-) 
s" (-) (-) (+) 
r" (-) (-) (+) 
P/V (+) (+) (-) 
W/V {-) ? ? 
'.Assumplion: Leisure is a normal good 
".Assumption: ("« 0. and r is fixed 
.Assumption: club profits positive, and r 
'.Assumption: f,, 0. 0. r is fi.xed 
is fi.xed 
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Having demonstrated the qiialitative implications for household labor supply of collective 
action around irrigation in a simplified structure, it is now appropriate to be more general. 
Specifically, let usage of the club input be endogenous rather than exogenous. That is, let the 
period over which the household makes decisions be such that the club input decision is also made 
during the period. The household's optimization problem is unchanged. The solution values for 
the problem are given by (Ml) to (M3). The equations that determine production can be written as 
W (Ml') f„ = — = w 
^ P 
(M2') f,+Crfc=^ = t 
where w and t represent the real wage and the real visitation toll, respectively. 
To determine how the optimal levels of the inputs change with the real prices, w and t, it is 
necessary to totally differentiate equations (Ml') and (M2'). This operation yields 
fxxdx + fxrdr + fxcCr(dr + d7) + fxcC^dZ = dw 
ftxdx + fn-dr + frcCr(dr + dr) + fn.CzdZ+ , 
Cr(fcxdx + f^dr + fccCr(dr + dT) + f^cC^dZ) + fc(Cn.(dr + dr) + Ci^dZ)^ 
which can be written in matrix form as 
'^XX f -h f C 
/pc ^iT ^frc'-r ^cc'-r •*" rr 
dx 
dr 
1 0 ^xc^'r 
0 I "(fn-Cr + fcccj + fcCn-) -(^rc^z + ^ cc^T^Z + ^ cCrz) 
^XC^'Z 
dw 
dt 
dr 
dZ 
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f.xx 
cpi f^rr ^rc^r ^^2 
1 0 ^xc^'r 
0 I -(p2 
^xc^z 
(^rc^z ^cc''r''z ''"^c'-rz). 
dw 
dt 
dr 
dZ 
where CPl = fa + Cr £x and (P2 = fm Cr +£c Cr^ +£: cw -
If we set dw, d 7 and dZ equal to 0 and premultiply both sides of the equation by the 
inverse of the 2x2 matrix then we obtain the partial derivatives with respect to the toil level. 
Similarly the partial derivatives with respect to the real labor wage are determined by setting dt, 
d r and dZ equal to 0. The matrix of these partial derivatives is the substitution matrix; 
(12.a.4) 
CX CK 
dvi at 
CT CT 
dvf di 
\_ 
A 
^ r r+ f r cCr+ 92  - < P l  
-cpi fxx 
where A is the determinant of the 2x2 Hessian matrix and is positive by the second order conditions 
of the maximization problem. As expected, the own price effect of the club input is 
negative <0 as is the own price effect of the private input x by the requirement that the 
V A / 
Hessian is negative definite (i.e. the second order suflBcient conditions of the maximization 
problem). The cross price effect of the private input is generally ambiguous even under condition 
CI. Nevertheless, diere may be cases where a negative cross partial derivative (fn) may be 
assumed which would ensure that, under CI, cpi < 0 and the optimal level of the private input 
increases with increasing tolls due largely to the strong substitutability among the inputs. These 
price effects are summarized in the following proposition. 
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Proposition 4-
A. Employment of the club input increases (decreases) with decreasing (increasing) unit cost. 
B. If CI holds and f„ 0, employment of the private input increases (decreases) with increasing 
(decreasing) unit cost of the club input. 
Proof; 
The proof for part A is apparent from (12.a.4). Regarding part B, it was demonstrated in 
the previous paragraph that if fxr < 0 and condition C1 holds then (pi < 0 so that — = —^ > 0. 
ct A 
The proof is complete. 
Suppose no toll was imposed on the household with respect to employment of the club 
input. For example, irrigation payments may be packaged with land payments such that the cost of 
irrigation to the household is a fixed cost not a marginal cost. In fact, transition to a market 
economy in Vietnam included the redistribution of government land holdings which were formerly 
operated by the collective to individual households. Households make payments to the cooperative 
for land more frequently than for irrigation although much of the land is irrigated. Consequendy, 
the household has incentive to irrigate until the marginal benefit of doing so is zero. That is, the 
marginal product of irrigation would be equated with the marginal effect of own household 
irrigation decisions on production through congestion. Levels of irrigation use would increase 
substantially beyond that which is consistent with a socially efficient outcome. In this situation, 
(Nash) decisions of club members are suboptimal and the potential efficiency gains for the club are 
not realized. Moreover, the welfare-enhancement role of a coordinating institution is lost. That is. 
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the situation is akin in results to a seasonal tax on the irrigators. This arrangement does not need a 
coop and, therefore, apart from other motivations for collective action, a coop is not sustainable. If 
the real price that households pay for irrigation services is given by (M2') then the potential 
eflSciency gains are realized. The coop has a welfere-enhancement role and is, therefore, 
sustainable. These points are summarized in the following remarks about sustainability. 
Remark I: As t goes to 0 the incentive for defection from the efficient level of club input usage 
increases, the efficiency gains are not realized and the club is generally not sustainable. 
Remark 2: As t increases to T P ftdl efficiency is realized The cooperative is generally 
sustaimble. 
The foregoing analysis depicted on Nash behavior on the part of the household. For 
completeness the following analysis examines Pareto behavior which may be exhibited in the 
community. That is, under certain conditions a fijlly operational club may be observed despite the 
absence of a toll. Faaors which may explain such an observation include societal pressure to 
conform production decisions to that which is deemed by the community as acceptable. In these 
cases, economic incentives may be insuflBcient to explain behavior. Those households which 
demonstrate cooperation in the absence of economic decisions to do so are referred to as Pareto-
minded individuals. 
To be more formal let Pareto-minded households solve the Pareto problem characterized 
by (1), (2), (12.1), and (12.2) for reasons which are neither quantifiable nor economic. The first 
order conditions for the Pareto-minded producers are 
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(12.b.l) fX = w 
(12 .b2 )  f r  +  s c r f c=0  
It should be emphasized that these households are voluntarily acting in the collective best 
interest, not in self-interest. In particular, the benefit of an extra unit of the club input is balanced 
against the cost incurred on ALL (s) of the other households. This feature defines a Pareto-minded 
household. 
Equation 12.b.2 can be rewritten as 
fr+Crfc =-(s-l)Crfc => ff+Crfc = t(x,r) 
which bears some resemblance to 12.a.2. Here, the toll is not an exogenous parameter, a fact 
which is emphasized by the fiinctional dependence on the choice variables, r and x. However, 
substituting the solution values of the Nash problem into this fimction and solving gives the value 
of the toll which would compel Nash-minded households to conform to the Pareto outcome. That 
is, let t" solve 
t = t(r"(t),x"(t)) ^ -(s- l)Cr(sr"(t),Z)fc(x"(t),r"(t),c(sr"(t),Z)) 
where x"(t) and r^(t) are the solutions to equations I2.a.l to 12.a.3. (The exogenous variables - w, 
r , and Z - have been suppressed.) Also, t" denotes the level of the toll which compels Nash-
minded households to conform to the Pareto outcome. In other words, 
xP =x"(t") 
rP =r"(t") 
Appealing to the relations obtained in I2.a.4 the following proposition obtains. 
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Proposition 5-
If no toll is assessed on householdsfor employment of the club input then 
a) Pareto-minded producers employ less of the club input than do Nash-minded producers. 
b) Iff XT -  0 then Pareto-minded producers employ more of the private input than do Nash-minded 
producers. Furthermore, if the private input is a normal coi^ sumer good, Pareto-minded 
producers supply more of the private input to the market than do Nash-minded producers. 
Proof; 
Note that 12.a.4 shows that the substitution matrix equals the inverse of the Hessian matrix 
of the production function. For a strict maximum resulting in the optimal values x(t,w) and r(t,w) 
the Hessian must be negative definite, implying global quasiconcavity. Thus, the price eflfects 
depicted in the substitution matrix characterize the global properties of the optimal values. In 
particular, x(t,w) and r(t,w) monotonically decrease in their own prices. 
By definition, t" is positive and is the value that compels Nash-minded producers to 
produce at the optimal level which is obtained for Pareto-minded producers when they face 
t=0. A reduction from t" to zero in the toll faced by Nash producers increases their demand 
for the club input according to the effects in the substitution matrix. Similarly, if fa- < 0 then a 
reduction in the toll from t" to zero increases their demand for labor in household production. 
Also, demand for leisure increases (due to the income effect since leisure is normal). 
Consequently, labor supplied to the market decreases. The proof is complete. 
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CHAPTER iV. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF COOP FORMATION 
AND UTILIZATION 
Since widespread market reforms began in earnest in the early 1990's the relationship 
between the government of Vietnam and rural institutions has changed dramatically. Most 
notably, collective farms in Vietnam which formerly served as a government mechanism to 
transfer surplus from the agricultural sector to the industrial sector could no longer serve this 
fimction. The emergence of markets for agricultural products and inputs severed the 
connection between the collective farm and the government. 
There still remains the important question about the efficiency and viability of 
agricultural cooperatives in Vietnam. The collective farm, formerly a government-mandated 
institution, was transformed by market reforms into an institution which may perform a 
welfare enhancing role in a competitive economy. In particular, the efficiency losses which 
are known to exist in competitive economies wth externalities, may be regained through the 
collective action that is embodied in an institution like an agricultural cooperative. This seems 
to be the case for irrigation, a partially non-rival agricultural input for which decisions by one 
farmer affect usage possibilities of other farmers. This paper reports evidence that irrigation 
not only possesses properties of publicness but also enhances the viability of agricultural 
cooperatives in Vietnam in the presence of widespread market reforms. 
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The Theoretical Model 
Participation in an agricultural cooperative 
Having developed a model of labor supply in the presence of a club input (Chapter 
III), a more simple model will be developed here that captures the incentives for participation 
in a cooperative. Recall that the agricultural cooperative is hypothesized to be the appropriate 
institution for coordinating household decisions in the presence of a club input. In addition, it 
was hypothesized that irrigation in Vietnam has features of publicness such that irrigation is 
properly characterized as a club input. A simple model would, at a minimum, have features 
that include a public input and include an institution that may or may not provide the public 
input. Such a model is described in this section. 
Firm profits for households 
Drawing from the model of the individual household developed in Chapter III, it is 
assumed that the households that participate in the cooperative operate like a single-product 
firm. Recall that in the model developed in Chapter III there were two components of 
household income- wage income and farm income. Using the same notation as before, we can 
write household farm income as, 
7cP = Pf(x,r,c(r+r,Z),T)-Tr-Wx-^^^ 
s 
where Wx is the opportunity cost of farm work. Maximal profits where only x and r are 
decision variables can be written as 
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:cP(P,W,T,Z,s,r+r,t) 
where P is the price received for the agricultural product which is produced with inputs, x and 
r, cooperative facilities, Z, and has technology parameter, T. Note that, just as in Chapter II, 
congestion (c(.)) enters the production function and depends on the extent of irrigation 
possibilities ( Z) and aggregate irrigation use (r + ?). The number of participating firms 
decreases shared costs, if any. The participating firm pays the cooperative T for the irrigation 
services received firom the cooperative and purchases x at price W. 
Assuming that households that do not participate in the cooperative are similarly 
single-product firms, farm income for these households can be written as 
7i"P =Pf(x,0,0, T )-Wx 
Again, maximal profits, obtained when x is a decision variable, can be written as 
Ji:"P(P,W,t) 
where P is the price received for the agricultural product which is produced with inputs, x, 
and has technology parameter, T. As above, the opportunity cost of farming is captured in 
the term Wx and is included in the determination of farm profits. 
Utility of households 
Recall that the model developed in Chapter III shed important light on the impact of a 
labor market. In particular, it was shown that the presence of a labor market separated the 
household production decisions from household consumption decisions. In the same spirit, it 
is assumed here that household decisions are made in two stages. In the first stage. 
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production decisions are made, including those related to the provision of labor to household 
production. In the second stage, after the realization of profits (net of the opportunity cost), 
the household makes consumption decisions over leisure and a consumable good which may 
be the same good as that produced by the household. Using the notation of Chapter HI, the 
household's optimization problem in the second stage can be written as: 
max U(y,xi,(j>) s.t. Vy + Wxi=;c + WX 
y.Xj 
Note that in the second stage, income derived fi^om selling the household product (i.e. 
firm profits for the household) and household output is exogenous. To reiterate, this feature 
is a result of a well-fianctioning labor market so that the decisions regarding household farm 
labor (x) and leisure (xi) are non-joint. Appealing to a less technical explanation, the situation 
may be considered a seasonal one in which the household farm labor decision is made during 
planting season and the off-farm labor decision is made thereafter. 
Maximal utility can be written as 
V(V,W,7i,X,(t)) 
where X is the total endowment of time possessed by the household and (j) is a parameter of 
taste. 
Participation in the agricultural cooperative occurs where 
Hp(V,P,W,Z,s,r+r,T,T,X,(j)) = 
V(V,W,7tP(P,W,Z, s , r+ r ,T , T ),X,({))-V(V,W,7c"P(P,W, x ),X, ( t ) ) >0  
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Note that maximal utUity is affected by the decision to participate in the coop through farm 
income (either or ). 
A number of important comparative static properties characterize participation in 
agricultural cooperatives. The club variables are a good starting point. Recall that congestion 
adversely affects production and, hence, farm profits for cooperative irrigators. 
Consequently, Z and r + r affect farm profits and, hence, participation positively and 
negatively, respectively. Similarly, T reduces farm profits (ceteris paribus) and s increases 
farm profits by reducing the household's share of the fixed costs. Thus, T and s affect 
participation negatively and positively, respectively. 
Now suppose that marginal utility of income is constant for the households. In this 
case, coop participation is determined on the basis of enhanced farm profits alone when 
variations in farm prices are considered. With respect to changes in the output price (P), 
changes in the participation fimction depend explicitly on the output supply differential. To 
the extent that cooperative irrigators produce larger amounts than non-cooperative irrigators, 
it is expected that participation varies positively with output price. With respect to changes in 
the labor wage (W), changes in the participation function depend positively on the marketed 
labor differential. To the extent that cooperative irrigation is labor-saving, it is expected that 
participation varies positively with the labor wage. 
Regarding the effect of household size on participation, constant marginal utility of 
income removes any incentive the household may have to become a labor-saving cooperative 
irrigator. That is, the fi-ee labor that is available fi-om an additional household member creates 
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additional income strictly through the labor market which is accessible to the household 
regardless of participation in the cooperative. When the marginal utility of income is the same 
between participation and non-participation the household size has no effect on the 
participation decision. But for decreasing marginal utility of income, the household that faces 
an increase in income due to an increase in household members favors the alternative 
associated with a higher marginal utility of income, which is also associated with a lower 
income. To the extent that cooperative irrigation is associated with higher incomes, 
participation varies negatively with household size. 
With regard to the price of the consumption good, both income and substitution 
effects are relevant, making the changes in participation dependent upon the relative strength 
of the income and substitution effects and prior beliefs about the different magnitudes of those 
effects between cooperative participants and non-participants. In general, it is not possible to 
sign the effect of a change in the price of the consumption good on the change in 
participation. 
To summarize, the effects of changes in the exogeneous variables on coop 
participation depend, for some variables, on prior beliefs about the status of participants vis-a-
vis non-participants. With the appropriate set of priors, the sign of the effect on participation 
ofZ, r + r , T, s, P, W, and X, are +, -, +, +. +, and -, respectively. 
Formation of agricultural cooperatives 
Having established the incentives for participation in an institution (a coop) that 
coordinates decisions regarding the use of a public good, it is now important to characterize 
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the incentives surrounding the formation of such institutions. To do so, we rely on 
characterizations of the costs and benefits of coop formation. In this paper, club formation 
refers to the economic feasibility of the existence of a club of the type described in the 
previous chapter. Where total costs of providing the club input exceed total benefits fi"om the 
club input, the club is economically infeasible and will not form. Of main concern here is the 
total costs and benefits aggregated over all club members, rather than the individual costs and 
benefits faced by households. 
Total costs and benefits for the provision of irrigation 
Let Z be the level of the irrigation facilities and let the cost of providing those facilities 
be increasing in Z. We can write the cost to the coalition of households which collectively 
provide (and consume) the facilities as C(Z). We assume that the total benefits for the 
coalition depend on the level of the facilities, the number of members of the coalition and the 
level of aggregate use of the facilities so that we can write the benefits as B(Z,s, r + r ). By 
assuming that benefits to the coalition are increasing in the number of members, s, it is 
implicitly assumed that the shared facility has some public features associated with it. That is, 
the benefits derived fi^om the usage of one member do not entirely reduce the benefits 
obtained by another member using the same facilities. Conversely, if the collective good is 
private in nature, benefits would decrease with an increase in s. That irrigation has public 
properties is a hypothesis that can and will be tested in this essay. 
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Cost-benefit analysis and coop feasibility 
When the benefits to the coalition exceed the costs to the coalition then it is 
economically feasible for a collective to form. However, the way in which the net benefits are 
distributed among the members is crucial to the sustainability of the collective. The club input 
model that was analyzed in Chapter II had the appealing feature of accommodating diverse 
production functions in the club so long as a per unit fee was assessed on irrigation services.' 
That is, producers with differing demands for irrigation services could attain Pareto optimality 
by acting collectively if those with higher demands for the irrigation services made larger 
contributions to the collective. A per unit fee accomplishes this precisely because the net 
benefits of collective action are distributed "fairly" among the members. However, a per unit 
fee is considerably more difficult to implement than a flat membership fee. Consequently, it 
would be easier to form a homogeneous, variable use club than a heterogeneous variable use 
club since a flat membership fee (one that is not affected by repeated uses of the irrigation 
facilities) is part of an optimal solution in a variable use club only if members are very similar 
in their demand for the irrigation services. In this case, everyone pays his share which is 
exactly the same as everyone else's share. 
Consider a mathematical formulation of coop formation. Let the coop formation 
variable be denoted as z*, so that 
' Although mixed clubs (i.e. heterogeneous memberships) were not expressly discussed, the 
model of individual optimization presented here is consistent with a variable use club which 
can support heterogeneous memberships. (See Sandler and Tschirhart [1984].) Fixed use 
clubs cannot. (See Berglas [1976a].) 
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z* = G(B(Z,s,r+r)-C(Z),E,x) 
where E denotes the degree of homogeneity among members such that a low value of E 
corresponds to a high degree of homogeneity among members and where there is some 
function G(.) that determines the level of the coop formation variable and where X represents 
community characteristics. A coop will form in an area where the coop formation variable is 
above some threshold level, say, z *. Thus, coop formation is associated with positive values 
of some function Hi(.) where 
Hf (Z, s, r + r, E, X) H G(B(Z, s, r + r) - C(Z), E, x) - z * and ^ > 0, -^ < 0, _S_ < o 
c s  c E  c ( r + r )  
The Empirical Model 
Having developed a model that captures the incentives faced by individuals that utilize 
an impurely public input and by groups that attempt to provide the public input, it is now 
desirable to disentangle these two sets of incentives. These two sets of incentives can be 
characterized as coop participation incentives and coop formation incentives, respectively. In 
a fully liberalized economy, the two sets are linked. That is, the reason(s) that independent 
economic units act collectively is (are) frequently associated with the reason(s) independent 
economic units continue to participate in the cooperative because the formation and 
participation decisions are made by the same set of agents. However, in a command economy 
this may not be the case. Although a central planner may have economic reasons for dictating 
the formation of a cooperative, those reasons may not coincide with the reasons individual 
agents choose to participate in the cooperative. Given the history of central planning in 
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Vietnam which excluded the commune from the formation decision of cooperative 
institutions, independence will be maintained between coop formation and coop participation. 
The type of data available for analysis dictates to some extent the type of technique 
used for the analysis. The variables of interest are coop formation and coop participation, 
neither of which is directly observable. However, whether or not a coop exists in the 
commune is available in the data and represents a binary variable that corresponds to the latent 
variable, coop formation. Similarly, whether or not a household obtains irrigation services 
from the coop is available in the data and represents a binary variable that corresponds to the 
latent variable, coop participation. Consequently, probit equations are the appropriate 
empirical models for these situations in which binary variables are available for latent 
variables. 
Equation (1) formalizes the empirical model by denoting the latent variable with an 
asterisk and the vector of explanatory variables with x. The error term, u, is distributed 
standard normal, for which the cumulative distribution function is denoted as <!>(.). 
(1) Yii =Pixii + Uii; i = l n 
yii = l ifyu>yi* = 0 
y i i =0  i f y J i<y i*  =  0  
Pi = Prob(yu = 1) = l-ct)(-PixH) = cI>(3ixH); i = 1 n 
P2 = Prob(yii = 0) = cD(-3'jXjj); i = 
The likelihood fiinction can be written as: 
L = nPf 
i 
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Taking logarithms and using a variable transformation^ yields 
lnL = Iln<D(P'iXiiqii) 
Maximum likelihood methods require first order differentiation of this expression (to 
obtain the gradient) and second order differentiation of this expression (to obtain the Hessian). 
The gradient and the Hessian can be written, respectively, as 
Based on these equations, maximum likelihood techniques can be used to obtain parameters 
for the probit equations associated with coop formation and participation. 
This simple model of institutional participation has a prescribed set of variables 
associated with it. The model dictates that variables be used which can be characterized as 
prices, demand shifters, technology shifters, cooperative goods or services, coop membership, 
and taste parameters. In addition, the level of aggregation differs such that coop formation 
requires commune level variables while coop participation requires household level variables. 
The main source for the data is the Viet Nam Living Standards Survey which consists of three 
separate questionnaires- the household questionnaire, the community questionnaire and the 
I Pi*liqii + 
^(P'lJtiiqii)J<I>(Pixiiqii) (q i i ^ i iKq i i ^ i i ) '  
The Data and Variables 
' See Appendix 2 for all the mathematical details and derivations. 
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price questionnaire. Rainfall data from the Legates global climatology was also used. A 
thorough description of these data sets is provided in Appendix 1. In addition, secondary data 
from the Ministry of Water Resources, Socialist Republic of Vietnam, obtained from 
Svendsen (1995) is utilized. 
There are several issues regarding the data and variables that deserve discussion 
including sample size, geographic distribution and precise definitions of particular variables. 
With regard to sample size, 3114 households of the 4800 total households surveyed in the 
Viet Nam Living Standards were used. Because commune data was used, for which only 
rural communes were surveyed, the urban households (30*32=960) were excluded from the 
analysis. In addition, there were 5 of the 120 rural communes that did not report the market 
wage for field preparation, eliminating 160 households from the analysis. Missing data for 
individual households required that 547 more observations be eliminated. The data 
requirements for the model are satisfied for households which cultivate rice, have rights to 
land and who live in rural communes. Finally, 15 of the remaining observations indicated that 
they received irrigation inputs from the coop even though the coop did not exist in the 
commune. These observations were discarded. 
Table 4.1 presents relevant commune level variables that will be used to estimate the 
coop formation equation. An examination of the geographic location of communes which 
have cooperatives reveals that none exist in the most southern regions of Vietnam. In fact, 
the southernmost commune with a cooperative is 150 km northeast of Ho Chi Minh City. 
Consequently, any explanatory variable that also possesses this geographic bias will have a 
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Table 4.1. Descriptions and statistics of relevant commune variables 
Variable Description 
IRLNDCOM binary (0,1)-1 where the commune has some inigated land 
COOPS binary (0,1)-1 wtiere the commune has a cooperative 
AREAIRGR estimate for the number of irrigators in the commtne 
ORYRAIN total amount (mm) of rainfall during the dry season (November through ApriO 
TRADIRR the percent of im'gation methods ttiat are not govemment schemes 
FEECOLL amount of paddy (kg/ha) collected as water use fees 
GINI gini coefficient of net agricultural income for the commune (0 is perfect income equality) 
COMIEST instrument for the level of aggregate irrigation use in the commune 
LNYIELO ttie natural log of [rice output (kg) / irrigated land (sq. m.)] for the sample im'gators 
LNOUT the natural log of rice output (kg) for the sample irrigators 
LNLAND the natural log of irrigated land (sq. m.) for ttie sample im'gators 
LNINSC the natural k)g of total insecticide expenditure (thou, dong) for the sample irrigators 
LNEQUI the natural log of the value of farm equipment (thou, dong) for the sample irrigators 
LNWKR the natural log of the number of agricultural worke's for the sample im'gators 
Table 4.1. (continued) 
n=115 n=88 
Variable Mean Std Dev Mean Std Oev 
IRLNOCOM 0.7652 0.4257 1.0000 0.0000 
COOPS 0.6435 0.4811 0.7046 0.4589 
AREAIRGR 1038.2647 911.2255 1350.1534 816.6430 
ORYRAIN 341.2522 206.1683 339.3864 206.6285 
TRADIRR 34.3330 18.8519 33.3421 18.6365 
FEECOLL 51.6957 37.4518 60.8296 36.9887 
GINI 0.0485 0.0286 0.0486 0.0218 
COMIEST 6.2589 3.4852 8.1793 0.1698 
LNYIELO 8.1336 0.3242 
LNOUT 18.9095 0.9869 
LNLAND 10.7759 0.8169 
LNINSC 7.2089 1.3288 
LNEQUI 8.6540 1.1491 
LNWKR 4.2112 0.5185 
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relatively large t-statistic in the probit equation for coop formation. This is the case for many 
of the variables used in the probit equation, including FEECOLL, GINI and TRADIRR. 
That many variables in Vietnam have this geographical bias demonstrates that social 
disparities still exist between the north and the south. With respect to participation in 
cooperatives the disparity is again apparent. (See Pingali and Xuan [1992].) Rather than use 
a North/South dummy variable, the analysis in this paper attempts to shed light on the 
economic incentives which may vary greatly between the north and the south with regard to 
participation in cooperatives. 
It should be noted that the variables used from Svendsen (1995), which include 
TRADIRR and FEECOLL, do not have much variation. These are regional variables where a 
single region can encompass as many as 36 sample communes. Vietnam is divided into 8 of 
these regions. 
For most of the variables in Table 4.1, 'he descriptions provided sufficiently 
characterize the variables. However, the variable for aggregate irrigation use (COMIEST) 
needs a more thorough description. Because no data exists on actual irrigation practices 
among households in Vietnam and because irrigation use plays an important part in the 
theoretical model, it is necessary to construct a suitable variable. Recall that r + 7 represents 
the level of aggregate irrigation use of the commune. For large irrigating societies, like those 
found in Vietnam", the level of irrigation use of the individual household is a relatively small 
portion of the total. Consequently, the error is negligible when r, and not r + r, is regarded 
" Note from Table 4.1 that the average number of irrigators in a commune is over 1000. 
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as aggregate irrigation use of the commune. For this reason, aggregate irrigation use of the 
commune is used to proxy 7. 
In order to arrive at a suitable estimate for aggregate irrigation use, it is important to 
consider the way in which irrigation affects rice production. Crop modeling systems offer a 
relation between rice yield and irrigation use. Reyes (1973) reports such a relationship for a 
number of rice varieties. Agronomic data was fitted to a logistic functional form to determine 
the parameters bi, bi, and bj of y, = r—, where yr is rice yield and r is irrigation use. 
l + b2e"''5'" 
Reyes reports values of bi in the range [4.83, 9.08] where the lowest value is associated with 
low nitrogen levels and a particularly severe dry season (and consequently, high rates of 
evaporation). The values for bj are correctly interpreted as the maximum possible yields for 
the variety. When viewed as a production flinction, bi is a vertical shifter for marginal 
product. Similarly, bi is a horizontal shifter for the marginal product. The coefficient bs alters 
the rate of change of the marginal product. (See Appendix 3 for figures that illustrate features 
of the logistic function.) Note that specification of these three parameters (bi, bi and bs) fully 
specifies the marginal product of irrigation use. Inverting the fijnction, one obtains irrigation 
use as a function of yield. 
^3 ^t)2yr b2>' "TT 7-Kb2). ^3 ^ t»3 
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Note that for bi/yr <1.1, ln(bi/yr -1)« ln(bi/yr). This condition implicitly assumes that 
the actual yield is not less than, say, 90% of the biological maximum which is a function of the 
exogenously determined state of nature that is associated with the growing conditions. In 
other words, it is assumed that the optimal output level, given input prices and technological 
parameters, is not too far below the biological maximum. That this is a reasonable assumption 
is demonstrated in Appendix 3. Making this substitution and simplifying gives 
r = -—In 
b3 
+ ^ ln(b2) = -^ln(yr)--^In(bi) + -^ln(b2) = ^ln{yr) + d 
"3 03 b3 b3 b3 
where d is some constant. The estimate of irrigation use is a linear transformation of the 
natural log of rice yield. 
The next step requires the regression of the estimate of irrigation use on determinants 
of irrigation use. Linear regression allows the substitution of r with In(yr) since the former is a 
linear transformation of the latter. Formally, the regression model is 
In(yri) = Xip + i^i; i = l,...,n 
The fitted values of this regression represent the instrument for irrigation use. It is 
important to note that in the household production model yield is endogenous. By using fitted 
values instead of actual values the endogeneity is no longer a problem. If the value of the 
estimate of the coefficient on irrigation use is a desirable parameter, it is necessary to divide 
the parameter estimate by an appropriate value for bs, say, 0.63 (the value obtained by Reyes 
for IRS, 100 kg/ha N, 1971 dry season, when irrigation use has units of mm per day and yield 
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has units of metric tons per hectare) in order to obtain the average irrigation use in nun/day 
for a representative plot. 
A variety of approaches to obtaining an estimate for aggregate irrigation use are 
available. The possible approaches range from primal estimation of an aggregate production 
function to dual estimation of an individual household production function. The method 
applied in this analysis estimates a primal production flinction at the commune level, appealing 
to the reasonable assumption that large transportation costs inhibit trade in inputs across 
communes. Assuming a Cobb-Douglas form of the production function allows the log-log 
form of the production function to be estimated by ordinary least squares, the variables of 
which are included in Table 4.1. 
Regarding an appropriate measure of household irrigated rice production, it was 
observed that of the five types of rice in the survey, spring rice necessarily requires irrigation 
so that the yield of spring rice is a very good measure of rice yield under irrigation. As 
supporting evidence in this data set of the relationship between irrigated rice and spring rice, 
one should note that of the 3367 rice producing households, 2672 planted spring rice, 2653 
had irrigated land and 2152 reported both irrigated land and spring rice cultivation. 
Furthermore, of those 2152 households, 1076 reported that the amount of land under spring 
rice cultivation was exactly equal to the amount of irrigated land operated by the household. 
Yield was calculated as the ratio of two reported numbers by the household, the amount of 
spring rice harvested and the amount of spring rice area. Of course, if the household reported 
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no spring rice the household was eliminated from the analysis. A sample size of 2484 
households resulted. 
Other aggregated household data include irrigated land, insecticide expenditures, 
equipment value and the number of agricultural workers. As Avith the rice output data, these 
measures were agggregated over all rice irrigating households in the commune and then 
transformed to the natural logarithm to obtain LNLAND, LNINSC, LNEQUIP, LNWKR, 
respectively. Ordinary least squares regression results are presented in Table 4.2 for the 
Cobb-Douglas form of the production functions. The results suggest a technology that has 
increasing returns to scale and is relatively labor-intensive, both of which are plausible, 
intuitive results for the case of Vietnamese irrigation. Also, equation (2) shows that the 
coefficient on LNLAND is not significantly different from I, verifying the validity of the yield 
relation of equation (1). 
Table 4.2. Parameter estimates for the instrument for irrigation use 
LNYIELD LNOUT 
(Natural log of img (Natural log of irrig 
rice yield) rice prod) 
(1) (2) 
Variable Estimate t Estimate t 
C 6.36391 19.311 6.14789 14.722 
LNLAND 1.04314 20.419 
LNINSC 0.07601 3.002 0.06618 2.371 
LNEQUI 0.07039 2.401 0.06855 2.328 
LNWKR 0.14545 2.534 0.10696 1.458 
R Square 
n 
0.29384 
88 
0.92445 
88 
The instrument of irrigation use is obtained by multiplying the coefiBcients in Table 4.2 
by the 3 variables listed in equation (I) for each of the communes that have irrigated land. 
Thus, the aggregate irrigation use variable, COMIEST, is constructed as 
COMIESTi = 6364 + 0.076 * LNINSCj + 0.070 * LNEQUI, + 0.145 * LNWKRj; i = 1,...,88 
Recall that the theoretical model predicts how the variables in Table 4.1 affect the 
probability of the formation of cooperatives. The coop formation model variables s, E, and 
r + f are proxied by AREAIRGR, GINI and COMIEST, respectively. The expected signs of 
these variables on coop formation are +, and respectively. In order to leam something 
about household utilization of local cooperatives, a set of relevant household variables were 
constructed from the available data. Table 4.3 describes these variables. The coop utilization 
model variables Z, r + ?, T, P, W, and X, are proxied by AREAILND, COMIEST, 
FEECOLL, AVGP, PREPWAGE and HHSIZE, respectively. The expected signs of these 
variables on coop utilization are +, -, +, +, and respectively. In the next section, evidence 
will be presented that suggests that the model of a congestible public input is quite relevant to 
irrigation in Vietnam. 
The dependent variables- COOPS for coop formation and IRRINP for coop 
utilization- deserve a more thorough discussion than what is provided for these variables in 
Table 4.1 and Table 4.3. Regarding coop formation, the data suggest that a very precise 
notion of the institution prevails in rural Vietnam. Specifically, it appears that the question in 
the survey referred to those institutions which were formerly collective farms, so that the data 
presents the existence of cooperatives that have explicit ties to the state. This data happens to 
80 
Table 4.3. Descriptions and statistics of relevant household variables 
Variable Description 
IRLNDCOM binary (0,1)-1 where the commune has some irrigated land 
COOPS binary (0,1 >-1 wtiere the commune has a cooperative 
IRRINP binary (0.1)-1 where ttie coop provided irrigation inputs on the annual crop land 
AREAIRGR estimate for the number of imgators in the commune 
ORYRAIN total amount (mm) of rainfall during the dry season (November through April) 
FEECOLL amount of paddy (kg/ha) collected as water use fees 
GINI gini coeffident of net agricultural income for the commune (0 is perfect income equality) 
AVGP average of three reported prices (000 dong) for srdinary rice in the commune 
RPI regional price index (cateulated by the WorM Bank) 
PREPWAGE wage (000 dong) reported by the commune for a day's work for a man doing field preparation 
AREAILND estimate of the amount (ha) of irrigated land in the commune 
COMIEST instrument for the level of aggregate irrigation use in the commune 
HHSIZE number of household members 
Table 4.3. (continued) 
n=3114 n=2446 n=1830 
Variable Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev 
IRLNDCOM 0.7855 0.4106 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 
COOPS 0.6953 0.4604 0.7482 0.4342 1.0000 0.0000 
IRRINP 0.5100 0.5000 0.6451 0.4786 0.8623 0.1273 
AREAIRGR 1120.7227 915.4135 1420.5500 803.5883 1517.7832 721.6326 
DRYRAIN 341.1220 206.8049 334.6791 203.8914 336.6694 213.7665 
TRADIRR 33.2416 18.5180 32.3591 18.2201 25.5433 1Z5909 
FEECOLL 55.1497 36.9823 63.9685 35.7063 80.0891 22.7277 
GINI 0.0469 0.0263 0.0474 0.0269 0.0363 0.0133 
AVGP 1.2251 0.3802 1.1800 0.3501 1.1982 0.3643 
RPI 1.0328 0.0630 1.0420 0.0621 1.0662 0.0482 
PREPWAGE 9.5745 4.3361 9.3283 3.9922 8.2410 3.4604 
AREAILND 3757298.9469 4452957.6943 4703075.6637 4551819.5384 3523780.5718 1839157.5520 
COMIEST 6.4251 3.3615 8.1798 0.1679 8.1391 0.1273 
HHSIZE 5.0299 Z1133 4.9137 2.1024 4.6858 2.0310 
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be quite useful since current policy discussions touch on the issue of whether the residual 
institutions from decollectivization should be fostered or discouraged. The results of this 
analysis suggest that state organized irrigation institutions have an economically viable role 
even after market reforms. 
Regarding coop utilization, irrigation services represent the relevant criterion that 
determines the association of the household with the cooperative. That is, household 
utilization of the cooperative is determined exclusively by the household decision of whether 
or not to receive irrigation inputs from the cooperative. Household utilization of non-
irrigation services provided by the coop is not considered here in order to focus attention on 
the role of irrigation in establishing the economic viability of an agricultural cooperative which 
has explicit ties to the state. 
Discussion of Results 
Discussion of coop formation 
Recall that coop formation depended upon the total benefits of the shared facility, the 
total cost of the shared facility, the marmer in which benefits and costs are distributed and 
community characteristics that support or undermine collective action in the community. The 
results of the probit model of coop formation are reported in Table 4.4. Consistent with a 
public good, the number of irrigators in the commune (AREAIRGR, an estimate for the 
number of irrigating households in the commune) positively affects the likelihood of coop 
formation. This result would not be expected in the context of a private shared good, in 
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which case an additional member would diminish the amount of the good available for the rest 
of the members by the amount consumed by the additional member. Total benefits to the 
coop would be fixed by the amount of the shared good. In contrast, if a fixed amount of a 
public good is shared the sum of the benefits to coop members increases when the number of 
members increase. This is precisely the effect that is observed with this data. 
Table 4.4. Estimates for coop formation 
Coop Formation Probit 
(COOPS) 
Variable Model Variable Estimate t-stat 
C 2.6557600000 2.289 
AREAIRGR S 0.0007549980 Z025 
DRYRAIN L -0.0015405700 -1.456 
TRADIRR 7. -0.0536250000 -2.294 
FEECOLL 7. 0.0200410000 2.197 
GINI E -25.2293000000 -i027 
COMIEST 7 -0.0479400000 -0.673 
Log Likelihood -24.309 
n 115 
Another result that is consistent with the theoretical predictions of the model is the 
effect of member homogeneity on coop formation. The data suggests that income inequality 
has a negative effect on coop formation. Although the variable, GINI, was calculated for a 
sample fi-om the entire commune and not fi^om the subset of coop members, the sets are nearly 
the same in many communes, particularly in the north. Consequently, GINI should adequately 
represent the degree of homogeneity among coop members. Assuming this is the case, the 
analysis suggests that the effect of like populations on coop sustainability is substantial. Since 
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the empirical model does not distinguish between a fixed-use and a variable-use model, no 
direct statement can be made about the non-rival characteristics of irrigation, whether the 
irrigation facilities are the non-rival good (as in a fixed-use club) or whether the irrigation 
services, which are made possible by the facilities, are the non-rival good (as in a variable-use 
club). The result obtained here is consistent with what one would expect when use of public 
facilities is paid for by an area-based irrigation fee. Such a situation requires that members 
have similar characteristics in order to sustain a cooperative. Consequently, the results 
provide some empirical support for the hypothesis that the facilities themselves and not the 
services which are derived firom those facilities represent the non-rival good. 
Collective farms and cooperatives represented the cornerstone of agricultural policy in 
the late I970's. Despite vigorous attempts to organize southern farmers into cooperative 
production units, few cooperatives formed. With the advent of market liberalization, eflforts 
to organize farmers ceased. But strikingly, the cooperatives in the north did not 
spontaneously disband as if the government's coercion was the only glue that held the 
cooperatives together. Rather, a stark disparity exists in which coop formation is high in the 
north and non-existent in the south. Such a disparity also exists in the GINI variable in which 
low values prevail in northern communes and higher values prevail in southern communes. 
Figure 4.1 plots the GINI variable against the commune number which increases from north to 
south. Noticeably higher levels of income inequality exist in the south. 
The notion that irrigation in Vietnam motivates collective action is further supported 
by a substitution effect between irrigation and the amount of rain that falls during the dry 
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Figure 4.1. Standardized GINI coefficients for Vietnamese communes 
season (DRYRAIN). That is, an increase in rainfall during the months of the dry season 
significantly reduces the probability of coop formation. It is important to note that 
DRYRAIN is not a disparate variable with respect to the north and south regions. 
There are also substitutes for the irrigation services provided by the state cooperative. 
Note that in areas where traditional practices of irrigation (TRADERR) like "swing baskets, 
buckets, small private pumps, and perhaps small gravity diversions" (Svendsen (1995), p. 4) 
which are not organized by formal government schemes are prevalent, there is a significant 
decrease in the probability of coop formation. This is fijrther evidence that irrigation activities 
are being coordinated through the cooperative in places where the cooperative exists. It 
should be pointed out that TRADIRR has very little variation. In fact, there are only eight 
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values corresponding to the eight regions in Svendsen (1995). Each region is associated with 
many communes. Consequently, TRADIRR is rightly considered to be exogenous to the 
commune. 
The sustainability of collective agriculture in the face of widespread market reforms 
depends upon the ability of the collective to cover the fixed costs of providing the shared 
good. In other words, the supply of cooperatives requires adequate financing of the shared 
good. Thus, the extent to which financial resources are extracted from households for 
irrigation services partly determines the sustainability of the cooperative. This is precisely the 
effect observed for FEECOLL. 
In general, the results of the coop formation analysis are consistent with the model that 
was formulated earlier. The rather simple characterization of collective costs and benefits 
matched the data fairly well. This analysis finds that market-oriented models explain the 
existence of cooperatives which have strong ties to the state. Specifically, where those 
cooperatives are organized around a public good, like irrigation, the association with the state 
does not imply inefficiency. In fact, such institutions perform a welfare-enhancing role in a 
market-oriented economy. 
Discussion of coop utilization 
Examining coop utilization is another way to evaluate the nature of cooperative 
institutions. Some have suggested that state-afBliated cooperatives still resort to coercion in 
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order to maintain participation levels even after market reforms/ What will emerge in this 
analysis is a picture of a transition economy that is representative of neither a pure centrally 
planned economy nor a pure market economy. The distinction between the two is observed 
most readily at the level of the cooperative where the participation incentives vary greatly 
under the two institutions. In a centrally planned economy, the existence of a cooperative (or 
collective farm) implies fiill participation of the agricultural population since the cooperative is 
an agent that the government uses to extract surplus from agriculture. In a market economy, 
the existence of a cooperative (or club) implies a set of incentives such that only a subset of 
the population will choose to participate, assuming the cooperative provides an excludable 
and partially non-rival good or input. Thus, the level of participation provides a clue as to the 
nature of the institution. Of the 1830 observations which reside in communes which have 
both a coop and irrigated land, only 252 (14%) did not receive irrigation inputs from the 
coop. However, only 167 of these reported that they did not receive irrigation inputs from the 
cooperative even though they had irrigated land. Figure 4.2 presents these facts in terms of 
two variables- lElRJNP (from Table 4.3) and IRRTOT (the total amount of irrigated land for 
the household). The data reveal a high incidence of coop provided irrigation services to those 
households that have irrigated land. It should also be pointed out that all of the 1830 
households received from the coop some kind of services which include biological protection, 
plowing or protection of crops, as well as irrigation. 
"* Tran and Nguyen (1995) state that "other cooperatives, in the Red River Delta, however, 
suffer bad management and their relationships with households are still overbearing and 
monopolistic." (p. 203) 
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Figure 4.2. Correlation of two variables. 
These facts demonstrate that household level interactions with the coop are 
widespread in areas where the coop and irrigated land coexist. Where it continues to exist, 
the cooperative may indeed have institutional features that are similar to institutions of a 
centrally planned economy. 
The model of coop utilization that was developed earlier assumed that no institutional 
constraints (or compulsions) exist that impinge on the household's decision. The estimates 
from that model are presented in Table 4.5. Where the empirical results depart from the 
expected theoretical results, there may be reason to infer that market institutions which 
underly the theory are not fiilly formed. 
Table 4.5. Estimates for coop utilization 
Coop Utilization Probit 
(IRRINP) 
(1) (2) 
Variable Model Variable Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat 
c -5.7953000000 -1.244 9.6918400000 Z644 
DRYRAIN X 0.0018505800 6.504 
FEECOLL T -0.0285850000 -3.903 -0.0035517200 -0.711 
AVGP P 1.1220100000 6.067 1.2460300000 6893 
RPl V 23.4408000000 7.338 11.2010000000 5.252 
PREPWAGE w 0.0199990000 1.533 0.0287190000 Z198 
AREAILND z 0.0000000754 2.958 0.0000000976 3.931 
COMIEST r -Z1738800000 -5.795 -^ 6817200000 -7.366 
HHSIZE x -0.0445470000 -Z265 -0.0506520000 -^ 665 
Log Likelihood 
n 
-552.312 
1830 
-579.23 
1830 
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In general, the results confirm the theoretical model. The theory predicts that an 
increase in the irrigation facilities strictly increases the probability of participating in the 
cooperative. As irrigation capacity increases, congestion from irrigation use is reduced, 
increasing prduction and farm profits and increasing the incentive to participate in the 
cooperative. The coefficient on AREABLND confirms this effect insofar as AREAILND 
captures the variation of irrigation facilities across communes. 
The enhanced value of the cooperative due to the facilities is offset by the level of 
irrigation use. That is, aggregate irrigation use increases congestion and reduces production, 
reducing the incentives to participate in the cooperative. As the instrument for aggregate 
irrigation use, COMIEST has a negative and significant effect on coop utilization, as 
expected. 
The charge assessed on households for irrigation services represents a disincentive to 
join the cooperative. In areas where water fees are high participation in cooperatives should 
be relatively weak. This effect is observed for FEECOLL, whose coefficient is negative but 
significant only in equation (1), Table 4.5. According to the theory, per unit irrigation fees 
reduce irrigation use of participating households. Similarly, per unit irrigation fees reduce 
maximal profits (and utility) for the household so that the likelihood of participating in the 
coop is also reduced. In addition, fixed irrigation fees may constitute membership fees in an 
irrigators' club. In this case, an increase in fees (whether flat fees or per unit fees) decreases 
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participation in the irrigators' club. That the effect of FEECOLL is unclear suggests one or 
both of the following effects 
(a) collected fees do not exactly correspond to charges on individuals. 
(b) irrigation is non-excludable 
Regarding (a), a supply side argument may be appropriate. That is, just as a decrease 
in the corporate tax rate may increase total tax revenues generated from the tax rate, a 
decrease in the irrigation charge may also increase total irrigation fees collected. Suppose that 
the irrigation fees are indexed to the level of production. A decrease in the irrigation fee may 
induce the household to utilize irrigation more intensively, boosting yields and possibly 
increasing the total irrigation payment. This notion is confirmed somewhat by Svendsen 
(1995); "In spite of its relatively low fee levels, the Red River Delta generated more revenue 
per hectare (101 kg/ha) than any other region during the past three years" (p. 15). In this 
case, the total fees collected corresponds poorly to the charges assessed on households. 
Regarding (b), it is helpful to think of fee collection for services and excludability from 
services as two sides of the same coin. When the services are non-excludable, fee collection is 
more difficult since there is no immediate recourse for non-payment, like shutting off the 
water. In this case, participation may occur regardless of the level of fees since the 
participants believe that the likelihood of actually having to pay the fee is small. In other 
words, the likelihood of free-riding behavior is large. In the opposite case where irrigation 
services are excludable, fee collection should be relatively high since the likelihood of free-
riding behavior is small. Taken together, these two scenarios suggest that fee collection 
90 
should be high when excludability is high. Exciudability may, in fact, vary across irrigation 
schemes so that the effect of fee collection on coop participation is ambiguous. 
Regarding the price variables, the intuition is roundly confirmed by the data. 
Specifically, the output price for household production (i.e. the rice price) is expected to 
increase participation in the coop based largely on intuitive reasons for supposing that rice 
supply is greater for coop irrigators than non-irrigators. The effect of AVGP bears out this 
intuition. Also, supposing that irrigation is labor-saving, it is expected that the labor wage 
increases participation in the coop so that higher levels of income can be secured. This effect 
is observed for PREPWAGE, whose coefficient is positive but significant only in equation (2), 
Table 4.5. 
Finally, the effect of the household labor endowment on coop participation represents 
a measure of the differential of marginal utility of income. Presuming that household income 
is greater in the cooperative, the differential of marginal utility of income is negative for risk 
averse households. The significantly negative coefficient on HHSIZE suggests risk aversion 
among rural households. 
Summary 
The empirical analysis in this section exposed two important realities. First, the 
analysis confirmed the publicness of irrigation and the appropriateness of the model outlined in 
an earlier section. Second, the analysis confirmed the viability of an irrigation institution that 
has explicit ties to the state. It was shown that where the coop continues to exist, provision of 
irrigation services represents a raison d'etre. Irrigation was determined to be an important 
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coop service that increased the likelihood of coop formation and increased the likelihood of 
individual household participation. The analysis substantiated the notion that irrigation 
services of a coop make it a viable institution in a market economy. Such institutions promise 
to enhance community welfare as measures are taken to price irrigation services at appropriate 
levels. 
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CHAPTER V. THE IMPACT OF IRRIGATION ON LABOR 
MARKET CONDITIONS 
That technical externalities destroy the eflSciency of a competitive equilibrium is a well 
known result that has undergirded arguments promoting the establishment of a strong, 
intervening government. There is, however, much more to be learned about the economic 
consequences of production interdependencies. While much attention has been focused on the 
production consequences of unregulated commons situations, very little attention has been 
focused on the consequences on input demand, input substitution or resource supply. 
The conceptual foundation is actually quite simple. In a commons situation, the 
decisions of all the other appropriators restrict the production possibilities of a single 
appropriator. In an irrigation context, the irrigation decisions of all the other irrigators restrict 
the irrigation decisions of a single irrigator. To the extent that irrigation is a substitute for 
other inputs, the demands for those inputs depend on aggregate irrigation usage. In 
household production units, household labor is a substitute for irrigation. Consequently, the 
supply of household labor to the labor market is also affected by aggregate irrigation use. 
This study investigates the effects of irrigation use and the level of irrigation facilities on 
household labor supply. 
Irrigation in Vietnam has important public consequences. Among the less obvious 
consequences are possible effects on the emerging labor markets in rural Vietnam. In this 
chapter, I exploit the link between labor markets and household production which utilizes 
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irrigation. An extension of the household production model to include irrigation as a club 
input was described and analyzed in detail in Chapter III. In this chapter, the theoretical 
relationships established in Chapter HI are analyzed empirically. The results suggest 
substitutability between labor and irrigation at the household level. In addition, the public 
nature of irrigation is supported by evidence of negative congestion effects of irrigation use 
and positive production effects of irrigation facilities. 
The Theoretical Model 
Consistent with the model of Chapters 11 and III, it is assumed here that the household 
is the relevant decision-making unit which faces resource constraints represented by labor and 
money and which maximizes a utility function that depends on consumption and leisure. 
Optimal levels of consumption and production can be determined by solving the following 
optimization problem. 
X = x + x, +xm 
Pf(x.r,c(r+r,Z),T)-Tr + Wx^ = Vy max U(y..\|.(()) s.t. 
m I 
Note that the consumable good (y) is purchased for price V as before with the income 
derived from ofF-farm employment (x^) which receives the wage W plus the sale of the 
household produced agricultural good which receives price P, less the cost of irrigation use (r) 
assessed at price T. Household production depends positively on on-farm labor (x), 
household irrigation use (r) and negatively on congestion (c(.)) which depends on the 
irrigation use of all other households plus the household's irrigation use (r + 7) and the 
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irrigation facilities (Z). Total household labor (X) is allocated among the following possible 
uses: on-farm labor, off-farm labor and leisure. 
Demand functions are obtained for y, xi, x, Xm, and r. In the presence of a well-
functioning labor market the demand for x, x^, and r is independent of the demand for y and 
X|. This is the non-recursive or separable feature which produced the clean results of 
Propositions 1 through 3 in Chapter III. Although employment opportunities are scarce for 
rural households in Vietnam, there are seasons when opportunities to do fieldwork are 
abundant. The market for field work is all that is necessary. We can write the ofF-farm labor 
supply equation as 
Xm = Xm(W,P,V,r,Z,X,T,T,(|)) 
The Reservation Wage 
The reservation wage (W^ for the household is the largest wage available to the 
household for which the household does not allocate labor to non-farm employment 
opportunities (i.e. Xm= 0). Consequently, we can write, W*^ = W'^(P, V,A,f,Z,XT,T,(t)),  
where t and (|) are technology and taste parameters, respectively. The probability of wage 
work, then, is precisely the probability that the actual wage is greater than the reservation 
wage. 
It is important to emphasize that the model stipulates that the ofF-farm decision is 
made simultaneous with the decisions regarding on-farm labor, leisure, consumption of market 
goods, and irrigation use. In general, the estimation of a single equation in the model yields 
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biased results since there is no accounting for the dependence of the choice variables on the 
error terms of the other equations. However, certain conditions remove this bias. 
Specifically, the existence of a well-functioning labor market separates the production 
decisions fi-om the consumption decisions as was demonstrated in Singh, Squire and Strauss 
(1986). Consequently, the disturbances in the consumption variables, y and X|, are not 
transmitted to the production variables x and r Furthermore, if the production function is 
weakly separable in the factors of production then the optimal input levels do not depend on 
the disturbances of the other inputs.' Under these conditions, plausible estimation procedures 
include single equation estimation techniques. The next section describes one such technique. 
The Empirical Model 
Having developed the theoretical foundations for the labor supply decision, it is now 
necessary to develop an empirical model that is consistent with these foundations. In 
particular, it is assumed that households allocate labor to off-farm employment opportunities if 
and only if the wage received exceeds the reservation wage of the household. 
Following others (e.g. Hufi&nan and Lange [1989], Tokle and Hufiman [1991], 
Hufihian and Tokle [1994]), let z* = W - W'^(P, V, A,7,Z,X,T,x,(t)) represent the wage 
differential that the household faces. As before. W is the wage received from off-farm jobs. 
By assumption, the household supplies labor to off-farm activities whenever z* is positive. 
Unfortunately, the reservation wage (W^ is not directly observable. However, whether 
' See Hoch (1958) for an example using the Cobb-Douglas form. 
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households allocate labor to ofif-farm uses is observable. The decision to supply ofF-farm 
labor is a binary variable that is correlated with the latent wage differential variable. Formally, 
the empirical model can be represented as 
(1) z*=Y'wi+Ui; i = I n 
Zj = I if z* > 0 
Zj = 0 if z, < 0 
ProbCzj = I) = Prob(Ui >-y'Wj) = i = l,...,n (T 
Prob(Zi = 0) = Prob(ui < -y Vj) = I - <D( ^ ); i = l,...,n 
a 
If Uj is distributed normal with mean zero and variance then (D(.) is the cumulative 
distribution function for the standard normal distribution. The likelihood function can be 
written as 
l = npr'p2^" '^^  
i 
where Pi is the probability that z; = I and P2 is the probability that z; = 0. 
Taking logarithms yields 
l n L =  V z i l n P i  +  ( l - Z i ) l n P ,  =  I l n O ( - ^ i ^ ) . '  
i=I i=l CT 
Maximum likelihood methods can be used to estimate the parameters, y/a. 
" See Appendix 2 for an explanation of the variable transformation for qi. 
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The Variables 
Table 5.1 presents the variables used in the analysis. Many of the variables used in this 
model are the same as those used in the previous chapter. Specifically, AVGP is used as a 
proxy for the price (P) of the household product. AREADLND is used as a proxy for the level 
of the facilities (Z) of the coop, HHSIZE is used as a proxy for the labor endowment (X) of 
the household, and FEECOLL is used as a proxy for the irrigation fee (T) assessed on the 
household. COMIEST is used as a proxy for aggregate irrigation use ( r ). 
Table 5.1. Descriptions and statistics of relevant variables 
Variable Description 
WGWORKHH binary (0,1)-1 where the housenold has some wage income 
RPI regional price index (calculated by the Worid Bank) 
AVGP average of three reported prices (000 dong) for ordinary rice in the commune 
PREPWAGE commune daily wage (000 dong) reported for a man doing field preparation 
HHSIZE number of household members 
AREAILND estimate of the amount (sq m) of irrigated land in the commune 
COMIEST instrument for the level of aggregate irrigation use in the commune (see Chapter IV) 
FEECOLL amount of paddy (kg/ha) collected as water use fees 
Table 5.1. (continued) 
n=3114 
Variable Mean Std Dev 
WGWORKHH 0.4145 0.4927 
RPI 1.0328 0.0629 
AVGP 1.2288 0.3830 
PREPWAGE 9.5526 4.3372 
HHSIZE 5.0299 2.1133 
AREAILND 3742446.4672 4447421.2211 
AREAIRGR 1116.7366 915.0208 
COMIEST 6.4251 3.3615 
FEECOLL 54.9476 37.0082 
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Recall that the proofs of propositions 1-3 in Chapter HI relied on fixed use of 
irrigation services (r) fo the household, at least in the short run. Note that in equation (2) of 
Table 4.2, variation in LNLAND explains virtually all of the variation in irrigation use, 
suggesting strong complementarity between irrigation use and land use. Since land is fixed in 
the short run, irrigation use is also properly considered fixed in the short run. 
With an effective labor market, the theoretical results derived in Chapter III as 
propositions 1-3 are expected. Specifically, an increase in the price (P) of the household 
product increases the value of marginal product of household labor which increases the 
reservation wage of the household which decreases the probability of wage work. Similarly, 
an increase in the level of the irrigation facilities (Z) increases the value of marginal product of 
household labor which decreases the probability of wage work by the same mechanism; an 
increase in the level of aggregate irrigation use (7) decreases the value of marginal product of 
household labor which increases the probability of wage work by the same mechanism. Also, 
an increase in the labor endowment of the household (X) increases the probability of wage 
work since the additional leisure, which is due to increased income, cannot fully offset the 
additional labor. An increase in water use fees represents a pure income effect which lowers 
the farm income curve and lowers the reservation wage (assuming leisure is normal), so that 
the probability of wage work increases. An increase in the price of the consumption good (V) 
has offsetting income and substitution consequences. Finally, an increase in the labor wage 
(W) strictly increases the probability of wage work and has no effect on the reservation wage. 
It should be emphasized that these comparative static results depend upon the separation of 
99 
consumption and production decisions. To summarize, the signs of the effects on the 
probability of wage work given changes in AVGP (P), AREAILND (Z), COMIEST ( r ), 
HHSIZE (X), FEECOLL (T), and PREPWAGE (W) are -, -, +, +, +, and +, respectively. 
Discussion of Results 
Table 5.2 summarizes the results of the reservation wage analysis. In general, the 
signs of the estimates obtained in this analysis are consistent with those predicted by the 
theory. 
Table 5.2. Maximum likelihood estimates for the labor supply equation 
WGWORKHH 
Variable Model Variable Estimate t-stat 
C -1.6958000000 -2.717 
FEECOLL T -0.0008058550 -0.682 
AVGP P -0.3013160000 -4.534 
RPI V 0.9033050000 1.454 
PREPWAGE W 0.0498400000 7.936 
AREAILND z -0.0000000145 -2.223 
HHSIZE X -0.0797020000 7.002 
COMIEST 7 0.0206430000 2.235 
Log Likelihood 
n 
% Correct Pred 
-2030.76 
3114 
0.620103 
Consider first the club variables, AREAILND and COMIEST, which confirm the 
effects derived in proposition 1. That is, as a proxy for irrigation facilities, an increase in 
AREAILND increases both the output level and the marginal product of labor by reducing 
congestion. The reported sign on AREAILND is negative, as expected. In contrast, an 
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increase in COMIEST represents an increase in congestion and, by contra-positive reasoning, 
an increase in the probability of wage work. The reported sign on COMIEST is positive, as 
expected. 
The output price effect derived by Lange is confirmed in tiiis data set. That is, an 
increase in AVGP increases the value marginal product of agricultural labor, increases the 
reservation wage and decreases the probability of wage work. The negative coefficient on 
AVGP is statistically significant. Similarly, the predicted effect of off-farm wage rate results 
fi^om this data set. As the off-farm wage (PREPWAGE) increases, the probability of wage 
work also increases. This effect is also statistically significant. The parameter estimates for 
FEECOLL and RPI do not have statistical significance. 
Summary 
Among the assumptions made in the analysis, a well-functioning labor market ensured 
the separation of production decisions from consumption decisions. Such a separation along 
with weak separability in the production function allowed single equation estimation of the 
labor supply decision. Empirical analysis of the labor supply decision produced results in 
general agreement with theoretical predictions. 
Some evidence was obtained for the theoretical link between labor decisions and 
utilization of irrigation. The notion that congestion effects, which are either abated through 
irrigation facilities or exacerbated through aggregate irrigation use, affect the marginal 
product of labor and not just output levels is confirmed with this data. 
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Where the model fails to perform as expected, one finds reason to reconsider the 
underlying assumptions. Further research should relax the assumption of a well-functioning 
labor market. Such an assumption may not be appropriate for this data since, at the time of 
collection, labor markets were only beginning to emerge. Also, use of a system of equations 
which allows for interdependence of input and consumption decisions may provide stronger 
evidence of the link between labor and irrigation. 
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CHAPTER VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The previous four chapters have contained a considerable amount of material which is 
both theoretical and empirical. It appears necessary to sift through the material, to extract the 
key contributions, conclusions and implications and to present them in abbreviated form. 
These items will be organized as theoretical contributions and empirical results, respectively. 
This chapter is not intended to rederive results or to reexplain conclusions. For those 
discussions the reader is referred to the chapter indicated. 
Regarding the theoretical contributions, a model was developed that has not yet 
appeared in the literature. Club models have routinely focused on the consumption of a 
partially non-rival, excludable consumption good. A club model was developed which 
focused on a partially non-rival, excludable production input. (Chapter H) Conditions for 
production efficiency were derived and compared with the efficiency conditions of a club 
good model. (Chapter 11). The model was inserted into a household production model in 
order to forge a link between a partially non-rival input and labor supply decisions. (Chapter 
III) The top level efficiency conditions were derived and served to highlight the 
distinctiveness of the club input model vis-a-vis the club good model. (Chapter III) In 
particular, it was noted that the membership condition hinges on the substitutability between 
leisure and the consumable good and the substitutability between labor and irrigation in 
production. Thus, the membership condition in a producer club is considerably more 
complicated than the membership condition in a consumer club. 
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Regarding the empirical results, household production and club theories were applied 
to the specific context of irrigation in Vietnam. Evidence was found to support the notion 
that irrigation has non-rival properties (Chapter IV), that the irrigation facilities, rather than 
irrigation services derived from the facilities, have some non-rival properties (Chapter IV), 
and that cooperatives can coordinate irrigation decisions (Chapter FV). Also, the transition to 
a market economy has not yet produced institutional reform at the level of the cooperative 
(Chapter IV). Thus, the results of this analysis support the findings elsewhere that economic 
reforms in Vietnam as in China have taken a pace slow enouch to allow for the development 
of appropriate insitutions. Also, quantitative measures are available from the results of the 
output differentials between coop members and non-members and of the substitutability of 
labor for irrigation (Chapter IV). 
In order to support fiirther empirical work, the economic implications of a logistic 
production function were derived. (Appendix 3) The logistic form of the production function 
provided a tractable and internally consistent means to obtain an estimate for a missing 
variable, irrigation use. Using this variable, estimates were obtained for a labor supply model. 
(Chapter V) Although considerably weaker than the other resuhs, some support was found 
for dependence of labor supply on features of irrigation (Chapter V). 
Regarding the empirical analysis of coop formation, the results would be a good deal 
more enlightening if institutional data was available. Unfortunately, such data does not exist 
and collecting the data would be very expensize since it would involve surveys of cooperatives 
throughout the country. If the questionnaire can be designed to afford analysis of other issues 
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such as farmer level cooperation and deterioration of social capital, the expense may be 
justified. 
It appears that the presence of a shared public good is not the entire story behind coop 
formation and participation in Vietnam. Others have noted the importance of crafting 
institutions which directly address the issues surrounding human interactions within a 
cooperative. An analysis of this sort which probes the nature of these interactions and the 
institutions which support or undermine productive interactions requires a more sociological 
bent than what I have presented here. Such a direction which explicitly examines human 
interactions promises to shed light on a variety of interesting issues regarding cooperative 
farming practices in Vietnam. 
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appendix 1. description of the data 
The Viet Nam Living Standards Survey 
The Coverage of the Data 
The Viet Nam Living Standards Survey (VNLSS) was conducted between September 
1992 and October 1993. The sample covers 4800 households throughout Viet Nam. 150 
communes were selected from the 10,000 that currently exist in Viet Nam. For each commune 32 
households were interviewed (32* 150=4800). 120 communes are rural; 30 are urban. For each 
household, extensive questioning regarding household agricultural production, health, schooling, 
employment, migration, housing, fertility, self-employment, and expenditures on food and durable 
goods produced a large set of information on each household. 
In addition to the household surveys, VNLSS contains information on each of the 120 rural 
communes. The community questionnaire includes information on each community's demography, 
economy, infrastructure, education, health and agricultural systems. The price questionnaire 
includes on a community level the prices of 36 food items, 31 nonfood items, 9 medicines, 7 
insecticides/fertilizers and 5 types of services from local markets. The price questionnaire was 
completed for 118 of the 120 rural communes. 
Selected Characteristics of the Data 
A preliminary review of the data provides the following information that is relevant to the 
proposed research project; 
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1. Of the 120 community questionnaires of rural communes, 77 indicate that there is a 
cooperative in the commune (i.e. a yes answer to "Is there a cooperative in this community?"). The 
southernmost of these communities is Di Linh in Lam Dong province, 150 km northeast of Ho Chi 
Minh City. Consequently, the data set does not include information on cooperatives in the 
Mekong Delta if they exist. 
2. Of the 78 communes with a cooperative, 60 indicate that they collect irrigation 
payments (i.e. a check in the E box to the question "What is the kind of items give to the 
Cooperative or Government? A. Allocation, B. Land Preparation, C. Fertilizer, D. Seed, E. 
Irrigation, F. Insecticide, G. Management Fee, H. Fund, I. Other"). These 60 communities 
represent 450,000 people. 
3. Of the 78 communes with a cooperative, 9 indicate that they give nothing to the 
cooperative (i.e. no checks in any of the boxes of the question "What is the kind of items give to 
the Cooperative or Government? A. Allocation, B. Land Preparation, C. Fertilizer, D. Seed, E. 
Irrigation, F. Insecticide, G. Management Fee, H. Fund, 1. Other"). 
4. Of the 4800 households, 2044 received at least one of the following 4 services from the 
cooperative not represented by the 5 in the table. These are irrigation, biological protection, 
plowing, and protection of crops. Of the 2044, 1325 can provide an estimate of the cost to them 
of the services received from the cooperative. Of the 1325, 1032 provided an estimate of the cost 
of each of the four services received from the cooperative. Of the 1032, 199 provided an amount 
that they paid for irrigation. 
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5. The 199 households that paid the cxx)perative for irrigation are located in 25 separate 
communes, of which 7 are represented by only one household. Of the remaining 18 communes, 10 
are represented by more than 8 households. These 10 communes represent 167 of the 199 
households and are located in 4 provinces (Hai Hung, Nam Ha, Thua Thien and Binh Dinh). The 
southernmost commune is Tay Son in Binh Dinh province located 440 km northeast of Ho Chi 
Minh City. One of these ten communes (commune number 50) is not among the set of communes 
which indicated that there was a cooperative in the commune. 
6. Of the 4800, 3961 indicated that some member of the family "worked as an independent 
farmer or family worker on a farm belonging to the household or raised animals belonging to the 
household." 
It should also be noted that annual crop land owned by rural households in Vietnam is 
categorized in the surv^ according to one of three institutions which conferred the ownership 
rights to the household. The three types of annual crop land are 1) allocated land which was 
transferred by the State or cooperative to the individual household, 2) auctioned land which was 
obtained by a competitive bidding process and 3) private land which had no prior ownership by the 
State. Of primary concern in this project is allocated land because of the high correlation with 
irrigation. 
Consider the irrigation information in the data set. For each household surveyed the 
amount of aUocated, auctioned and private land is provided as well as the amount of each which is 
irrigated. The total amount of irrigated land serves as a proxy for the level of irrigation facilities or 
infrastructure. 
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The Legates Surfyce and Shipboard Rain Gauge Observations 
In addition to the LSMS data, global rainfall data is available from The Legates 
Surface and Shipboard Rain Gauge Observations data set, referred to more succinctly as the 
Legates data set. Units of observation in the data set are surface areas represented by the 
global lattice constructed by 0.5 degree units latitude and 0.5 degree units longitude. This 
unit of observation is smaller than the average size of a province in Vietnam. The data set 
consists of monthly mean rainfall levels averaged over the years 1920 to 1980. Thus, the 
Legates data set provides both the level of annual rainfall and the distribution of rainfall over 
the year. A lengthy description of the data can be found in Legates (1987). 
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appendix 2. statistical theory of a bivariate probit 
The bivariate probit model is stated formally below where equation I is the probit 
equation for coop formation and equation 2 is the probit equation for coop participation. In 
equation 1, yu* is the latent variable, coop formation, and xti are the variables that affect coop 
formation. Similarly, in equation 2, y2i* is the latent variable, coop participation, and xji are 
variables that affect coop participation. Note that equation 2 is relevant only for those 
observations for which a coop exists. 
(1) yii = Pixii + "u; i = l,...,n 
Yli = I if yii > Yi* = 0 
y i i = 0  i f y i i < y i *  =  0  
Prob(yii = 1) = 1 - i = I,..., n 
Pr ob(yii = 0) = i = 1 n 
(2) yji = +"2i' i I,...,n observed only if yij = 1 
Yli = 1 if Yli > Yi* = 0 
Y2i=0 ify2i^y2* = 0 
Prob(y2i = 1)= I-ct)(-p^x2iX i = U-,n 
Prob(y2i = 0) = 0(-p^X2i); i = I,...,n 
(uipuii) ~ bivariate normal(0,0,l,l,p) 
Three events are considered in this analysis: I) coop non-formation, 2) coop 
formation and household receipt of services from the coop, and 3) coop formation and 
household refusal of services from the coop. The probabilities of these events are the 
following; 
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Pi = Prob(yii = 0) = ^("Pixii) 
P2 = Prob(yii = l,y2i = 1) = Prob(uii > 0,U2i > 0) = l-<I»(-p'iXii)-<I>(-P2X2i) + ^ '"'(-P'i*li'-P2*2i'P 
= 0b^(PixH,P2^2i,P) 
P3 = Prob(yii = l-yzi = 0) = Prob(uii > 0,U2i < 0) = <l>(-p2X2i)-^''^(-Pi*li "PzJ^Zi.P) 
= <I)''^(P'iXii,-|32X2i'~P) 
where and (£>'^(.) denote the standard normal cumulative distribution functions for the 
univariate and bivariate cases, respectively. 
The likelihood function can be written as: 
L = p(^~yii)pyiiy2i pyii(i~y2i) 
Taking logarithms yields 
lnL = (l-yii)lnPi+yiiy2ilnP2+yii(l-y2i)lnP3 
= (l-yii)In<D(-pixii) + yiiy2iln<D''^'(Pixii,P^X2i,p) + yii(l-y2i)ln<I>'"'(P'iXii-p^X2i-P) 
The log of the likelihood function can also be written as 
lnL = (l-yii)ln<D(P'iXiiqii) + yiiln<D''^'(Pixiiqii,P^X2iq2i'qiiq2iP) 
where use has been made of the following variables proposed by Greene (1993)' 
Qli = 2yii - 1 and 
q2i = 2y2i-l 
Note that these variables attach a sign (either positive or negative) according to the value of 
the binary variable. This allows the binary variables to be removed from the log of the 
' See page 661 in Greene (1993) for more details. 
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likelihood function altogether since the function can be written in such a way that the sign 
chages correspond perfectly to the values of the binary variables. The limiting case is the 
present one in which no observations exist for a particular combination of the binary variables. 
(There are no observations for coop non-formation and coop participation.) In this case, the 
binary variable for coop formation must still be used so that use of the new variable (qu), 
while helpful to see the pattern in the function, is admittedly redundant. 
Maximum likelihood methods require first order differentiation of this expression (to 
obtain the gradient) and second order differentiation of this expression (to obtain the Hessian). 
The gradient can be written as 
ainL 
cpi 
(i-yii) r yiiYzi 
-yii(i-y2i) 
<I>(PiXiiqii) <l>''^'(Pixiiqii,|3^X2iq2i'qiiq2iP) (qii^ii) 
<51nL 
"57 
^2^ (Pi^li^P2^2i'P) yiiy2i ^2^(Pi^Ii^~P2^2i'~P)i) + yii(i-y2i) (-*2i) 
<t)''^(Pixiiqii,3^x2iq2i'qiiq2iP). 
.bv/ 
(q2i*2i) 
—- yiiy2i +yii(i-y2i) 
cp P2 P3 
^ ^ ^3''(Pixiiqii'P2X2iq2i'qiiq2iP) 
^ (Pixiiqii^p25^2iq2i'qiiq2iP) 
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where is the derivative with respect to the ith argument of the cumulative bivariate 
standard normal distribution function, ). Analytical expressions for these derivatives 
can be derived fi^om the density function. Specifically, let the bivariate standard normal 
density function be written as: 
, --—!-^(w--2pwx^jr) 
(j) = . e 
P 
SO that the cumulative distribution function can be written as 
I F  A '  1  ^ ; - ( v / - - 2 p w x - j r )  
<D'"'(pr,;r,p)= j j —?—=e dxdw 
-oo-cc2KyJl-p^ 
Distributing the integrals and simplifying yields 
,  U r - w -  A '  U r - ( - 2 p v f r ^ x - )  
cD''''(Pr,J^,p) = -^ J e -p=== je c£cc/w 
^271 _x V27i(l-p^)-x 
1 , 1 . , . 
1  I f  — w -  ,  A '  ; - ( ( x - p w ) - - p - w - )  
J" e ^ J e ^ dxdw 
^-oc ^|2K{l-p^)-oo 
1 , 1 , ,  I  
1  » '  — w -  ^ ( - p - w )  ,  A '  ; - ( . r - p w ) -I f 7n-n-^ 7fl-ri-^ I J e ^ e ^ . = J e P ^ dxdw 
1 1 
.— I e ^ I = J e P ^ dxdw 
* —X )/27i:(1-p~) —X 
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X-QW dx 
Now make the variable substitution, v = so that dv = , and 
V ^-P" )/l-p" 
A'-pw 
>/l-P' 
r' ^ 2 
^ —V 
<D''''(fr,X,p) = -^ f e 2 ^ Je 2 
V^_oc v^-oc 
>/27t 
IF 1 ^ fK vi;-
J e 2 (J) 
—00 
Jf-pM' 
cAv 
Taking the derivative with respect to the first argument yields 
dw 
r \ 
X - p W  
j •, = (j)W-(D 
f \ 
X - p W  
j 1 
W/-P" J W^-p > 
By symmetry, the derivative with respect to the second argument is 
1 
dX 42K 
C \ 
W - p X  
1 •) = (i)(A5-(D 
W - p X  
j , 
W^-p'^ W^-p"> 
The derivative with respect to the third argument, the correlation coefficient, is simply 
the probability density function 
I 
cd5''(W,X,p)=(|)''^(>I',X,P) = I 2(l-p-) 
— (w'-lpwX-AT ) 
27C-y/l-p^ 
In order to prove this assertion let 
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where gi(p) = and g2(w,x,p) = ^—:^{w--2pwx~x-) 
2(1-p^) 
Then 
P f  W  K  W A - a  W A . ; : ;  
<1)3^=—f f(|)''^(w,x,p)dxdw = f f—(J)^^ (h',x,p)dxdw = f f—gi(p)e®-^^^"'''^Mxdw 
dp  cp  cp  
 X w X -
= T +gi(p)^eS^(''--^-P)dxd 
dp  dp  
>w 
W X 
= J Jgl(p)eg^("'--^P) ^ggl 1 ^ Cg2^ 
W X 
= J i<!)'"'(h',x,p) 
V dp  gi(p) dp  ;  
dxdw 
dxdw 
V dp  gi(p) cp 
S impl i f y ing  the expression in the parentheses gives 
% = ((27u)-ip(l -p2)-3/2j|(27C)(l j ggl 1 I ^g2 _ 
cp gi(p) cp 
+ -
1(1- p^)(-2wx) - (w^ + - 2pwx)(-2p) 
2 (1-p^)^ 
p ^ (l-p~)(wx)-(w^+x^-2owx)(p) 
(I-P^) (I-P^)^ 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 p ^wx-pwx-pw -px T-2pwx_wx + pwx-pw -px ^ p 
(l-p^) (1-p^)^ (1-p^)^ d-p") 
Now consider the function h(w,x,p) such that 
jj h(w,x,p)(j)''^'(w,x,p)dwdx = (j)^^(M',x,p) 
Differentiating the expression gives 
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U f  ^ A b v / -  X  5  ^  d  f  h(w,x,p)(j) (w,x,p) = —^ = — gi(p) 
owcx dx.\ 
-IN 
= gi(P) ^2 ^§2 ^g,(w.x.p) J ^Sl ^g-,(w.x.p) 
dw dw dwdK 
^2 ^ g-,(w.x.p) 
dw 
= g,(p)eS=l»'^P' & _%2 S2 
ow 5w ^cx 
= (|)'"'(h',X,P) gg2 ag2 , d^Si 
dw dw dwdx. 
so that 
h(w,x,p) = ^^ + £j2- = 
dw dw dwdK 
2 2 2 wx - px - pw + p wx ^ p 
w-px  f x-pw , p 
I  1-p^j  \ 1-P^J l -p^  
(i-pf '-P' 
It is now clear that the assertion is correct since 
h(w,x,p) = i—+ -^. 
C9 gi(P) cp 
If the correlation coefiBcient is zero, the model simplifies to a sample selection probit 
modeP and the gradients of the maximum likelihood estimates are greatly simplified. 
Specifically, if p = 0, then the coop formation and participation equations are independent and 
can be estimated separately with techniques that are much simpler than maximum likelihood 
methods and still yield consistent estimates of model parameters. 
To be more formal, consider the likelihood function when independence is assumed. 
In that case, the bivariate standard normal cumulative distribution function can be written as 
^ A precise formulation of this model will be provided below. 
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= <I>{X) fe 2 dw = <J>{X)^{W) 
Consequently, the probabilities. Pi, P2, and Pj, can be written as 
Pi = Prob(yii = 0) = 
P2 = Prob(yii = l,y2i = 1) = Prob(uii >0,U2i > 0) = 1 
= (D''^0ixii,p^x2i,p) = <I>(Pixii WP^X2i) 
P3 = Prob(yii = I'YZi = 0) = Prob(uii > 0'"2i ^ 0) = *f>(-p2*2i)" <I>^^ (-P'i*ii-p2*2i.P) 
= <D''^(Pixii,-P^X2i-P) = 0(3ixH)<^(-P2i2i) 
Using these probabilities and the variable transformations, qii and qa, the log of the 
likelihood function can be written as 
InL = (I - yii)lnPi + yiiy2i lnP2 + yii(l - y2i)lnP3 
= (1 - yii)ln<D(-pixii) + yiiYzi ln(a)(Pixii)<I>(P^X2i)) + YliCl" y2i)ln(<I'(P'l*li)^(-p2*2i)) 
= (1 - yii)ln<D(-pixii) + yiiy2i ln<D(P'iXii) + yiiy2i ln(D(P2X2i) 
+yii(i - y2i)'n<i>(P'i*ii) + yii(i - y2i)in<i>(-p2X2i) 
= (1 - yii)ln<D(-Pixii) + yii ln<D(Pix,i) + y^ ln<t>(q2iP2X2i) 
= ln<D(qiiPixii) + yii ln<D(q2iP2X2i) 
Differentiating the log of the likelihood function with respect to the model parameters yields 
the following gradients. 
^InL _ (|)(Pixuqii) 
Wl^iiqii) 
51nL_ <l)(p2X2iq2i) 
CP2 L^(P2*2iq2i) (q2i5t2i) 
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It can be shown that the gradient for pi is exactly the same as the gradient that would 
be obtained by maximizing the function InL = (1 - yij)lnPi + y^j ln(l - Pj), which is the log 
likelihood function for probit estimation of the coop formation equation. Note also that the 
gradient for P2 has exactly the same form except that it is multiplied by the (0,1) binary 
variable, yu, which indicates the existence of a cooperative. Consequently, probit estimation 
of the coop participation equation for those observations that have yu = 1 has exactly the 
same optimization condition. It is now clear that maximum likelihood estimation can be 
replaced without any loss of efficiency by the simpler technique of a sample selection probit 
model. This model has two separate probit equations- one for the coop formation equation 
and one for the coop participation equation where the sample has been restricted to those 
observations for which a cooperative exists. Thus, the independence of the error terms 
greatly simplifies the statistical analysis. 
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appendix 3. mathematical properties: logistic function 
The logistic function is frequently used to model agricultural production in agronomic 
studies. In this appendix, the mathematical properties and economic consequences of this 
particular functional form will be discussed. 
A production relation with a logistic functional form can be written in the following 
manner; 
k 
l + be"^ 
where y is the output obtained from input x. The variables k, b and c are constant 
technological parameters which are frequently estimated in agronomic studies. 
The marginal product of x is 
5y _ kbc-e~^ 
General Features 
The shape of the curve conforms to basic economic assumptions, including positive 
function values and slopes throughout the range of positive real numbers, and decreasing 
slopes throughout a relevant range of positive real numbers. In the figures below, the function 
and its first derivative is plotted using k = 10, b = 5 and c = 0.5. 
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Figure A3.1. A Plot of a Logistic Function 
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Figure A3.2. A Plot of the First Derivative of a Logistic Function 
The function approaches k asymptotically so that k is frequently interpreted as the 
biological or technological maximum for the output. Consequently, an increase in k stretches 
the function to higher levels and shifts the marginal product curve up. An increase in b shifts 
the marginal product curve to the right and an increase in c shifts the marginal product curve 
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upward and to the left. The effect of varying the value for c between 0.1 and I is presented in 
Figure A3.3. 
2.5f 
2 4 6 8 10 
Figure A3.3. A Plot of the First Derivative, Varying c 
Optimizing Behavior 
The optimal level of x is obtained by setting the marginal product of x equal to the real 
cost of the input x (T/P). 
cy kbce -ex 
CX /, , -cx\^ p (l + be"")' 
Solving for x involves an expression which is quadratic in Specifically, the 
expression is 
—e"'^ = 1 + 2be-^ + b 
Simplifying the expression yields 
+6iz+1 = 0 where z = e 5i = 2b - , and 82 = b^. 
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The solution for z is simply 
• -6i ±)/5f —462 
25^^ 
kcpy kcP"! 
T A T J 
2b 
—  I ± ,  1  - 2  
T V V kcPj 
2b 
Note that real solutions to the optimization problem are obtained only when kcP/T > 
4. It should also be noted that only one of the two solutions satisfies the second order 
conditions. It can be shown (but not here) that the marginal product curve is hill shaped and 
that only the solution on the downward sloped portion of the curve (where the second 
derivative is negative) satisfies the second order conditions. Consequently, the relevant 
solution for x is the greatest of the two real solutions. This solution corresponds to the least 
of the two real solutions for z. That is, the solution that satisfies the second order conditions 
is the solution that includes the negative sign, not the positive sign. 
Substituting this expression into the production fiinction yields the optimal output 
level. 
k k y = 
1 + be I + bz 
Rewriting this expression to obtain an expression for k/y yields 
122 
kcP 
— = 1 + be""' = 1 + bz* = 1 + b 
l - J l - 4T 
kcP 
- 2  
2b 
kcP j 
TF' 
1 - J l -
4T 
kcP 
A limit on k/y may be an important empirical question.' Moreover, it is desirable to 
know the restrictions a particular limit places on the constants. To investigate this issue, 
consider the following formulation for k/y. 
y~  2  
f 
i - J i  — < L where K=(kcP/T) and L is some limit placed on k/y. 
Solving for K as a function of L yields 
K 
2 
< L 
£ 2 L  
K - VK ^ - 4 K < 2 L  
K - 2L < VK^-4K 
K^-4KL + 4L^ <K^-4K 
-KL + < -K 
< K(L - 1) 
(L-l) 
< K = kcP 
We now know the lower limit of kcP/T when an upper limit is placed on k/y. 
' In Chapter V, an assumption on the limit of k/y formed the basis of an important empirical 
step. 
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Consider an example. Suppose that L = 1.1, in which case the actual yield, y, is 
greater than 90% of the biological maximum, k. Drawing from the results reported in Reyes 
(1973), let k = 7.42 t/ha and c = 0.63. Drawing from the data reported in Svendsen (1995), 
let T/P (the real cost of irrigation services) = 0.047 t/ha. With these values, we obtain 
^ kcP 
(L-1)- T 
1.1^ ^7.42*0.63 
(1.1 - 1) " 0.047 
12.1 < 99.46 
This example shows that realistic values for technological parameters and prices 
produce a result for k/y such that it does not exceed 1.1. To reiterate, we have shown that 
under reasonable conditions, profit maximizing agents who have a logistic production function 
will choose an input level such that the resulting output will be greater than 90% of the 
biological maximum that is implied by the logistic production function. 
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